The failure of the trade ministers meeting in Cancun was bad for both rich and poor countries. Injustices remain and the global economy has been sent a mixed message. The talks were organised to get high-level agreement on how and what to negotiate to implement the Doha Development Agenda, which should be finalised in late 2004 at a conference in Hong Kong. In trade diplomacy, process is vital. Alas, process defeats substance every time. This meeting was never going to be decisive, nor was it ever going to be possible to get immediate results in agriculture, or any specific areas. It was misleading for some to even suggest as much. No one can hope to just deal with issues of interest to them. All must be woven into a final undertaking so that tradeoffs are transparent. All this is disappointing, but not fatal. Deadlines have been missed, but that has happened before. However, without change it is going to be very difficult to conclude the Doha Round on time. To their credit, ministers had the agricultural negotiating structure within their grasp; the big players softened their demands on new issues like investment and competition, but could not convince some key developing countries of the need to examine transparency in government, purchasing and trade facilitation. All sides must take something home if we are to succeed. Yet the system cannot function if 10 per cent of world trade can frustrate the will of the other 90 per cent. No trade round has ever failed before. But today, we live in different times. Multilateralism is under siege in just about every area of international relations. Trade was the shining exception. It always puzzles me that some extreme protesters who call for multilateralism spend so much time attacking the World Trade Organisation, the one international institution that effectively practices multilateralism - the only international institution where every nation, mighty or modest has, in effect, a veto. That is the WTO's greatest strength - and weakness. Missed deadlines could be especially dangerous this time because of the gathering momentum of bilateral and regional deals. We must remember that the WTO and a multilateral trading system were created after the great depression and the second world war to prevent the rise of potentially hostile trading blocs. Bilateral and regional deals are, by nature, exclusive. Everyone wants a deal with the big players. This gives them greater power to pick and choose partners and products. So far, such deals have neither handled the tricky issues of agriculture, nor established any credible legal mechanism to handle dispute settlement. In 2005, all kinds of regional deals could come to the fore. If the talks involving WTO officials in Geneva stall in December, that gives more impetus to less palatable options. It is not just the big players who should be blamed. They also have needs, and many are beginning to think that it will be quicker to build blocs of open trade which, in a decade or so, may come together. Economists will point out the weaknesses of regionalism because of trade diversion, conflicting rules of origin and difficult, contradictory and costly agreements. But politicians want to sign things; they need success and headlines. I am still optimistic. There is so much for every nation to gain, and even more to lose. Key ministers, such as Robert Zoellick of the US and Pascal Lamy of the EU, may not be in place in 2005. Thus, the deadline in late 2004, after US and Japanese elections, becomes even more critical. Unfortunately, nations have the right to commit economic suicide. The tragedy is that in a multilateral system, they also have the opportunity to pull the house down on everyone else. The answer? A coalition of self-interest must be put together and an offer worked out that is too good to refuse. This takes diplomacy and risk, not TV sound bites. It is about knowing what people need, not what they want. It is only 15 months until the next ministerial meeting. Mike Moore, a former prime minister of New Zealand, was the World Trade Organisation's first director-general
