China and India: sailing closer?
As an old-fashioned Asian nationalist, I rejoiced last Friday when Indian and Chinese warships engaged each other in their very first search-and-rescue operations. Three Indian ships (a destroyer and a corvette, both capable of carrying guided missiles, and a replenishment vessel) visited Shanghai for the exercise.
The significance lay not in the event's military impact, but in its political message. It opened a new frontier that could have a profound influence on regional stability. India and China are rising Asian powers. Both have nuclear weapons. Both have blue-water ambitions. Boys who play together do not fight each other. But to close ranks, they must first exorcise the canker of suspicion.
Indian strategists see the Association of Southeast Asian Nations playing a leading role in the process. At last month's Bali summit, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee proposed an Asean plus four - India, China, Japan and South Korea - grouping that might heal the wounds of the past and lay the foundations for future solidarity.
Japan, for instance, has not fully lived down its second world war record in parts of Asia. Neither have India and China faced up to the causes and consequences of the 1962 war. However remote the possibility of a recurrence of that confrontation, history warns against dismissing anything as impossible. Security is largely a matter of perception; much depends on national sensibilities.
Although Sino-Indian relations have been improving steadily, the Indian defence ministry's annual report claimed only a few months ago that it could not ignore the fact that 'every major Indian city is within the reach of Chinese missiles'. A week before the Sino-Indian exercise, China's navy was involved in a similar drill - its first ever - with ships from Pakistan, a country that has fought three wars with India and which Indians accuse of sending Islamic terrorists into Kashmir.
Within days of the exercise, Pakistan's military ruler, Pervez Musharraf, was a guest in Beijing. China is also Pakistan's principal military supplier. Not surprisingly, India's defence ministry also noted these developments.
Similarly, it would be surprising if China did not wonder about India's intensifying strategic interaction with the US. The very fact that India is not part of the coalitions on Afghanistan and Iraq may make this co-operation appear even more surprising. US Pacific Fleet warships docked at Indian ports all through the Afghan campaign; there were 24 joint Indo-US measures during the Iraq war; and India carried out anti-piracy patrols in the Straits of Malacca on behalf of the US-led alliance against terrorism.
Understandably, perhaps, China has responded by taking a more active interest in maritime affairs. The People's Liberation Army's focus has been shifting from land to sea. Beijing wants 'extraneous' influences kept out of the Indian Ocean. It is interested in energy security and the safety of sea lanes. Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes discussed some of these concerns with Jiang Zemin, chairman of the Central Military Commission, in Beijing in April.
The naval engagement is one of several prongs in a developing relationship whose highlight is the Confederation of Indian Industry's Made in India exhibition in Beijing. One thrust is to marry India's software expertise with Chinese skill in hardware to explore the Japanese and South Korean markets. Another is co-operation between the iron and steel industries in the two countries. A joint study group on economic co-operation has been promised for the near future.
Most revealingly, perhaps, China has agreed to trade with India through the Nathu-la pass in Sikkim, even though it still claims that Sikkim is not part of India. The paradox provides space for diplomatic manoeuvre in a partnership that has yet to reach fruition.
Meanwhile, two parallel projects reflect Sino-Indian competition in Southeast Asia. The Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Co-operation Programme involves China, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, while the Ganga-Mekong Swarnabhoomi Project involves India, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. Asean's shared umbrella would help avoid wasteful duplication and soften the edge of rivalry. More importantly, it could facilitate the political understanding and economic co-operation that alone will inject real substance into the symbolism of last Friday's naval exercise.
Sunanda Kisor Datta-Ray is a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. The views expressed in this article are those of the author
