On a visit to Okinawa, which has long borne a disproportionate share of the US military presence in Japan, I was peppered with questions about plans to redeploy the soldiers elsewhere. Residents had high hopes that the move would lighten their burden, but I could not reassure them.
Okinawans complain that their island, which is less than 1 per cent of the Japanese land mass, hosts 75 per cent of the US military presence in Japan. Strictly speaking, that number is not correct: Okinawa hosts 75 per cent of single-use military facilities - those used by US forces alone. Add bases that both Japanese and US forces use together and it falls to just under 24 per cent - still a hefty load. More significant is that US bases take up 20 per cent of the island, crippling the economy and ensuring all residents are burdened by the US presence.
A more equitable distribution has long been demanded. That is not to say all Okinawans want the Americans out. Many profit from the bases; others benefit from the compensation money the Tokyo government offers. Most Okinawans know that US forces help bring stability and security to East Asia. Still, they feel that they bear a disproportionate share of the presence.
Oddly enough, they see an ally in US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, who took office believing that new international realities, security threats and military capabilities called for an overhaul of the US military presence worldwide. Despite the new security priorities, Mr Rumsfeld never abandoned his efforts. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan tested his thinking. The success of smaller, mobile forces appeared to prove that he was right.
Okinawans are also closely watching developments in South Korea. They know the US plans to consolidate and move forces there and anticipate similar moves in Okinawa. They were disappointed because I could not tell them their load would be lightened. No one can: Final decisions have not been made. But we can be sure of a few factors. Redeployments will only occur after consultations with US allies. There will be no unilateral decisions and the process will be slow. Both governments have to be comfortable with the final outcome. It also makes no sense to redeploy amid a crisis on the Korean peninsula. The US cannot risk sending the wrong signal to North Korea. The consolidation of US troops in South Korea is expected to take three to five years.
Still, I believe there will be a reduced US presence in the region. Several factors reinforce that conclusion. First, a decade ago, the US commitment to the region was in doubt. To eliminate fears of a US withdrawal, America said it would maintain a presence of 100,000 troops in Asia. It was primarily symbolic: it provided a benchmark to measure the US commitment. Today, the commitment is not questioned, which makes the 100,000 figure unnecessary. Instead, the operative phrase is 'capabilities-based planning' - preparation for a broad range of contingencies rather than specific threats. Given the mobility and flexibility that this requires, a smaller presence makes sense - backed up with pre-positioned supplies and 'lilypads' rather than bases.