China would appear to be in an ideal position of influence over the Korean peninsula. As North Korea's only ally, Beijing has demonstrated its influence by persuading the North Koreans to sit down for another round of multilateral talks in the near future on the fate of the North's nuclear weapons. And as South Korea's leading trading partner and a tempting target for investment, China has convinced leaders in Seoul of its desire for peace and stability on the peninsula, rather than humiliation of the South by the North. South Korean and American leaders may be disillusioned, though, if they think that China's success in bringing about talks will lead to a resolution of the nuclear crisis, much less a permanent Korean peace. For one thing, China's real influence in Pyongyang may be severely limited. Second, China may see a divided Korean peninsula as the best guarantee of its own security in Northeast Asia. Nor is China at all likely to give unqualified support to US demands for the North to abandon its nuclear weapons programme as a prerequisite for a guarantee of security. Those who think that China is going to get seriously tough with North Korea overlook the legacy of the Korean war, in which more than one million Chinese died fighting to save the North from annihilation at the hands of US forces. The Chinese 'volunteers', committed by Mao Zedong a year after the defeat of the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek, might have taken the entire peninsula had the Americans not recouped enough strength to drive them back across the mountains north of Seoul. For all the cant about juche, or self-reliance uttered by Kim Il-sung - the North Korean leader who persuaded China and the then Soviet Union of the wisdom of invading the South - the North, ever since the disaster of the Korean war, has relied on China as the ultimate bulwark in time of need. Washington's reluctance to face China head-on in a second Korean war has been the main deterrent to any designs the Americans may have had on the North. At the same time, China has provided North Korea its only consistent opening to the rest of the world, including the South, while keeping the North's economy alive, if barely, with aid and advice, as well as highly circumscribed quantities of food and fuel. Times, to be sure, have changed remarkably since the dark days of the Korean war and its aftermath. China now counts on its huge trade surplus with the US as an enormous source of income, and Americans are welcome as visitors in a country where mobs once shouted anti-American epithets during the Cultural Revolution. So heartwarming is the relationship, in many respects, that US officials persist in the view that China is almost as anxious as they are to bring about a change in the fundamental outlook of North Korean leaders. It is one thing, though, to host multilateral talks in Beijing and another to ensure that the talks will get anywhere. For Beijing to provide its offices for negotiations only fortifies the sense that China is the dominant power over the entire Korean peninsula. For China, the spectacle of North and South Korea facing off, with the Americans viewed as the enemy in Pyongyang and a dubious friend in Seoul, all under the eyes of Chinese middlemen, may be an ideal state of affairs. Chinese negotiators have often suggested that the US adopt a more 'flexible' policy towards North Korea, flexible in the sense that the Americans should issue the requisite 'guarantee of security' without any noticeable sign of reciprocity on the North's part. On the basis of that beginning, in the Chinese view, the talking might begin in earnest. North Korea, however, has said that it wants much more than signatures on a paper guaranteeing 'security'. For starters, it wants America to resume monthly shipments of heavy-fuel oil, suspended in late 2002 after the North had acknowledged it had a programme for developing nuclear weapons from enriched uranium. In addition, North Korea wants to be removed from the State Department's list of states supporting terrorism and a lifting of the US embargo on trade and investment, along with massive aid. North Korea's demands are no doubt negotiable, but there is no sign the Chinese would side with Washington against Pyongyang in a showdown. One sign that China is not likely to help is its refusal to back down on its policy on North Korean refugees. Only in a few highly publicised cases has China acceded to South Korean requests to send North Korean refugees to the South. Such cases are largely symbolic. Negotiators should expect months, possibly years, of talks, preferable to war but not likely to resolve the nuclear standoff. The only sure winner will be China, bolstering its influence over both Koreas while the peninsula remains divided by an artificial barrier zealously guarded by hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides. The wild card remains the degree to which North Korea increases its nuclear threat, in terms of both development of warheads and export of technology. If US officials somehow think China is worried about the rise of a nuclear power on its doorstep, the fact remains that Chinese officials have shown no overt concern about North Korean proliferation. For peace to endure, the Chinese, besides hosting talks, will have to convince their North Korean ally that the time has come to halt the programme even if dismantlement and inspection remain the impossible dream of all but a few diehards in Washington. Without a few substantive results, the confidence placed in China will fade and it will find its influence over the Korean peninsula may not be as meaningful as hoped by its own leaders, as well as the United States, South Korea and Japan. Donald Kirk is the author of two books and numerous articles on Korea for newspapers, magazines and journals
