I am increasingly pessimistic about the survival of the US-South Korea alliance. Without quibbling over whether it is in 'crisis', there are good reasons to worry about its long-term prospects. These concerns crystallised last week at a conference about developments on the Korean peninsula. Those discussions underscored the growing divide between American and South Korean views of the alliance and, more troubling, how to deal with the problems that have emerged.
Of course, the United States has much to do with perceptions of the alliance. Its behaviour influences South Korean thinking about the value of the security partnership, and polls show that opinions of the US are declining globally. By that standard, South Korean doubts are part of a global trend.
But South Korea is a treaty partner of the US and revised thinking about America could have direct effects on US security interests. And the polls show an alarming deterioration in South Korean views of the US. A study last May by the Pew Centre for the People and the Press found that 50 per cent of South Koreans had an unfavourable view of the US, overshadowing the 43 per cent who thought well of their ally. A 2002 Gallup poll showed 53 per cent of South Koreans disliked America, while only 37 per cent liked it. It is tempting to dismiss those results as manifestations of anti-Americanism. It is also wrong. Anti-Americanism is a complex phenomenon - especially in South Korea. At one conference, we counted 15 variants on the theme.
More important, the numbers ebb and flow. A 1994 Gallup poll showed 64 per cent of South Koreans liked the US; a 2000 Pew survey found that 58 per cent had a favorable view of it. That should give grounds for hope: South Korean political scientist Kim Woo-sang has shown how education can change views.
Education can only be effective when people speak up to defend the alliance, and it is precisely the failure of South Korean supporters to make their case to the public that is so worrisome. Instead, when challenged, they respond by saying that Americans should not be so concerned by polls. They point to a 'silent majority' that still looks favourably on the US and appreciates its presence in South Korea. I have heard a lot of that since a recent poll showed 39 per cent felt the US was the biggest threat to peace on the peninsula, more than those who felt threatened by North Korea.
The problem is that the silent majority is too quiet: it is not responding as the alliance is being challenged, and that contributes to the erosion of confidence in the relationship and views of the US.
When alliance supporters are not dismissing the critics, they are relabeling them, claiming that the 'new wave' merely represents the maturation of South Korean democracy. South Korea, they argue, is becoming more like the US. It is now a more pluralist, democratic society. That is used both to explain the divergence of views and, oddly, to diminish its significance. Their logic seems to be that since the two societies appear to be converging, their alliance should be more resilient.