No time to waver
Since Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa's visit to Beijing in early December, the Chinese authorities' strategy regarding political reform in Hong Kong has become quite clear. In the first place, through formal and informal channels, Beijing has been telling people that it will have full control over the entire process, and that it has considerable reservations about democratisation. In this way, it has been trying to lower expectations.
Further, the Chinese authorities adopted delaying tactics, demanding to define various issues of principles and process, thus avoiding public consultation at the beginning of the year, as had been promised by the Tung administration.
Then, the Chinese government fully mobilised Hong Kong's pro-Beijing united front and business leaders to articulate support for its position. Finally, the pro-Beijing united front launched a propaganda campaign against leaders of the pro-democracy movement, aimed at reducing Hong Kong people's support for it, and to justify Chinese leaders' worries about democratisation. This strategy has proved effective within a matter of months. Opinion polls show that the community's support for the direct election of the chief executive through universal suffrage in 2007 and the entire legislature in 2008 has dropped from a peak of about 80 per cent in the second half of last year to below 60 per cent. Even before the formal decision by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, people already realised that the chances of achieving these objectives were slim.
The lowering of the community's expectations on political reform may discourage a segment of the population, and they will probably go back to their traditional political apathy. At the same time, some people may be reluctant to engage in confrontation with the central authorities.
The community usually has no reservations about attacking the Tung administration, but many do not want to openly criticise the Chinese leadership, fearing it may adversely affect the city's stability and prosperity. The pro-democracy movement's most important tasks remain the same. It has to continue to mobilise people to take part in the protest rally on July 1 and in the September Legco election. A high turnout in both is essential to maintain the movement's momentum. In turn, maintaining solidarity is essential to attracting a high turnout on both occasions. Without unity, people's support will decline.
Beijing accepts that it has to control the entire reform process because it feels the Tung administration cannot be relied on to prevent the pro-democracy camp winning half the seats in Legco come September.
However, the Chinese leadership is also paying a substantial price. It has to continue to support Hong Kong economically, yet gifts will generate considerable dissatisfaction elsewhere in China. Beijing's high-handed strategy to contain the demands for democratisation in Hong Kong has badly damaged its reputation of self-restraint, won through patient efforts since 1997.
The pro-democracy movement is still willing to engage in dialogue with the Chinese authorities. But it must not adversely affect the movement's solidarity. A firm position may result in some of the very limited opportunities being missed. A wavering position will lose the support of Hong Kong people; the very foundation of engaging in dialogue with the central authorities.
Another important challenge is to present a rational policy platform in the September election, in order for people to understand that the pro-democracy groups also support stability and prosperity. Fighting for democracy in Hong Kong is an arduous, long-term process. A rational, principled stand is the only way to maintain people's support and the momentum of the pro-democracy movement.
Joseph Cheng Yu-shek is a professor of political science at City University of Hong Kong
