Australia's superpower balancing act
Last week, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer found himself in the uncomfortable position of trying to straddle the barbed-wire fence that exists between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan. On his way to mediate talks over the North Korean missile crisis, Mr Downer stopped off in the Chinese capital. In response to a question about what support Australia would provide to the United States if Taiwan were attacked by Beijing, he said that no one should assume Australia would automatically come to America's aid.
The statement is significant because Australia's formal alliance with the US, the 60-year-old Anzus Treaty, obliges the two parties to support each other in the event of an attack or conflict with a third party.
As a result, the comments drew criticism from Mr Downer's counterparts in the US State Department and from the US ambassador to Australia, Tom Schieffer. In Washington's view, Australia's obligation under the treaty in the event of a military conflict over Taiwan is 'pretty clear'.
By the end of the week, with Mr Downer's political opponents accusing him of being 'irresponsible', Australian Prime Minister John Howard appeared to side with the US by saying Australia and America 'have to consult and come to each other's aid when we're under attack or involved in conflict'.
The public brawling reflects the difficult and delicate, but critical, nature of Australia's relationship with the world's only superpower on the one hand, and an emerging superpower on the other. Relations with the US have rarely been closer. Australia, a frontline participant in the Iraq war's 'coalition of the willing', recently agreed a free-trade deal with the US estimated to be worth A$6 billion (HK$33 billion) a year. With this in the bag, Australia is now seeking a similar deal with China. A study by both countries is due to be finished by October next year.
China is now Australia's second-largest export partner - after Japan - having, ironically, overtaken the US. It was to Australia that China turned in 2002 to source its first large liquefied natural-gas contract, worth A$125 billion.
More than 70 per cent of China's aluminium oxide and 40 per cent of its iron ore imports come from Australia. And as Australian Trade Minister Mark Vaile noted this month, manufactured exports to China have risen 134 per cent between 1999 and last year. Some sectors of the Australian economy are less than enthusiastic about a free-trade deal with China; the plastics, chemical and cement industries accuse the Chinese of flooding their markets with cheap goods. But the fact is that Australia believes it cannot afford to miss out on an early free-trade agreement with the world's newest economic powerhouse.
It is against this backdrop that Mr Downer's remarks need to be seen. And while his comments on Taiwan landed Australia in hot water with the US and sparked a domestic political slanging match, he drew praise from some experts in Australia-China relations. Ross Garnaut, a former Australian ambassador to China and a leading trade expert, told The Australian newspaper that Mr Downer's comments represented 'wise foreign policy in terms of the Australia-China relationship'.
Professor Garnaut was joined in his praise by Alan Dupont, a foreign-policy expert with the Lowy Institute, a Sydney think-tank. He was quoted in the same article as saying: 'For Mr Downer to make the point publicly in Beijing suggests a significant shift in our relations with the US and a growing recognition of China's power in the Pacific.'
While the timing and nature of the comments may have been less than optimal, they do show that Australia needs to carve out its own strategic position between the US and China if it is to keep both these major powers on side.
Greg Barns, a senior political adviser to the Australian government from 1996-99, is now a political commentator based in Australia
