The Anti-Secession Law was enacted with the aim of preventing Taiwan breaking away from China. In the period leading up to the passing of the legislation, there was much speculation that it would lead to the two sides of the Taiwan Strait getting closer to armed conflict. Indeed, Taiwan has responded strongly.
On closer reading of the law, however, one should not paint such a pessimistic picture. For one thing, it has not forced reunification on Taiwan, but only sets out the mainland's bottom line to keep the cross-strait status quo.
Article 2 says that there is only 'one China' and that 'both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China'. Such phraseology has not deviated from the mainland's standard wording.
Beijing accepts the so-called 1992 consensus, whereby both the mainland and Taiwanese authorities subscribed to there being 'one China' - but each could interpret it in its own way, with Taiwan clinging to the Republic of China legacy. The 'one China' policy underpinning the Anti-Secession Law is no harsher than in the past.
Article 3 depicts the Taiwan question as one left over from China's civil war several decades ago. Implicitly, this recognises the current divided state, with two 'governments' and rival jurisdictions within one country, a state of affairs that made the 1992 consensus a pragmatic way of framing the problem. The law has not equated 'one China' to the People's Republic. Beijing has left room for manoeuvre in cross-strait negotiations over the future form of reunification.
Under Article 5, using peaceful means to achieve reunification is still Beijing's policy goal. Since the 1970s, when China became an active international player, its leaders have repeatedly emphasised that a peaceful reunification is preferred, but military means will not be ruled out as a last resort. In a sense, there is nothing new in the law.