Their own worst enemies?
My remarks last week about acting Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen's credentials as a free marketeer stirred a mix of emotions. Some readers saw that, although endorsing Mr Tsang's actions in 1998 in defence of free-market principles, I suggested he may have lost that zest, citing the West Kowloon cultural hub as an example.
One declared that the solution to Hong Kong's 1998 financial crisis would have been for the Monetary Authority to have devised a less vulnerable framework for the Hong Kong dollar peg beforehand. Hindsight is wonderful. However, when faced with a crisis, those in the front line must cope with reality, not just wring their hands in regret at not having anticipated it. In fact, the deficiencies of the framework (which has since been amended) had been far from self-evident; otherwise it would not have taken 15 years for such a crisis to happen.
Another view was that the 1998 stock market intervention was conducted more at the behest of Hong Kong's tycoons - smarting from the erosion of their wealth - than in the interests of preserving fair markets. It is almost impossible to disprove such an allegation to the satisfaction of those intent on believing it, since it seems certain that Hong Kong's business elite did indeed lobby the government to act to arrest the deteriorating situation. However, the government took the action which it judged best for Hong Kong as a whole. Since this also happened to especially please the tycoons, it is predictable that some people should cry foul.
Such suspicions are also fuelled by the fact that, since 1997, business interests have been more firmly embedded in government than ever before (they were already close enough), and certain decisions - such as Cyberport and the cultural hub - and omissions - the stalling on a competition law - have plainly been influenced by the tycoons.
But decisions on economic policy will always sail close to business interests, and so risk generating rumour and suspicion. Some measures - perhaps the majority - will be favourable to business. This does not necessarily make them wrong, or corrupt, even if they do reflect lobbying.
On reflection, the tycoons are perhaps their own worst enemies. They pontificate imperiously on all manner of economic and political matters, often egged on by the media, and with a certain disdain for the public at large. This engenders some antipathy, to the point where there is a danger of anything involving them being seen as a legitimate target for accusations of collusion or favours.
Although some comfort may be derived from the fact that Mr Tsang has never been a businessman, his sympathies appear to lie in that direction - perhaps inevitably, given the interaction of the business elite with Beijing.
There is no early prospect of any diminution of business presence in the corridors of power, but, at the very least, the government should be more open about the background to its decisions. We do not need a referendum at every turn, but we do deserve sufficient information to produce confidence in, and respect for, official decisions - both of which are often lacking at present.
As for the tycoons, if they want to win over the sceptics, they might consider any of the following: spend less time looking self-important at meetings in Beijing; refrain from anointing any candidate for chief executive; do not insult the intelligence of the man in the street; and if they are serious about community work or charities, be seen to do something more than just cut a ribbon or sign a cheque.
They could also: resign from those advisory roles for which they have no great interest or no time, and seek the appointment of genuine new blood in their place; refrain from blatant nepotism; and lastly, once in a while, dismiss the minders and go out on to the street to sample the real world.
Tony Latter is a visiting professor at the University of Hong Kong
