IF as seems possible the Sino-British talks have come to a standstill and the parties are preparing to go it alone, it is time for Hong Kong people and their legislative representatives to take stock of the parties' adherence to the Sino-British Joint Declaration. This is, after all, the most important of China's often asserted ''three convergences'', the one to which both parties are bound by international law. In this regard it must be remembered that an international legal order that favours self-determination for colonial regions, as is expressly provided in the United Nations Charter, is the backdrop against which the Joint Declaration was entered. Any peculiar exceptions the parties created for Hong Kong did not erase the general tenor of this commitment. It would have not been acceptable to ignore totally the concerns of Hong Kong. It was in this context that the parties in 1984 entered an agreement with many specific promises of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The failure of the current Sino-British negotiations and the recent Chinese attacks on the Hong Kong Bill of Rights provide reasons for grave concern about adherence to these commitments. But the attack on the Bill of Rights cannot be considered in isolation. A broader assessment in these three important areas reveals what might be called the ''three non-convergences''. These are revealed on the face of the Basic Law if regard is given to what appears as recent interpretations of that document by China's representatives in Hong Kong. One can only hope that China distances itself from such non-complying interpretations. Especially if the parties are to go it alone China must be careful to ensure that excessive zeal by members of its Preliminary Working Committee (PWC) and others does not produce increasing divergence from the principles of the Joint Declaration. By the same token Britain is bound as a colonial power and as a signatory to that agreement to insist on compliance. As it was written the Basic Law, while questionable with regard to achieving its stipulated compliance with the Joint Declaration, was subject to some interpretations that would bring it reasonably close. This required extremely liberal interpretations and possibly a few amendments. In other words, its deficiencies were repairable through interpretation and amendment in a liberal spirit. Is that spirit prevailing? In the current atmosphere the answer is obviously no. The interpretations of the Basic Law now offered in the three key areas outlined above are noteworthy for their glaring non-convergence with the Joint Declaration. Regarding democracy, the Joint Declaration promised that the SAR Chief Executive would be chosen by ''elections or consultations'' held locally and that the Legislature would be chosen by ''elections''. Presumably there was to be some distinction betweenthe two. Elections generally mean elections. In this area the Basic Law is, at face value, grossly deficient. The only hope at its promulgation was that it might be amended after some successful experience or, at least, broadly interpreted to expand the numerous legislative constituencies that are so small as to amount to nothing more than consultative institutions. As now strictly construed, the Basic Law does not comply with the Joint Declaration's requirement for ''elections''. On the human rights front the score is proving equally dismal. After a long struggle in the Basic Law drafting process the human rights provisions had finally come out better than the earlier drafts. But again interpretation is the key factor. Now there is talk among some China advisers that would see the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, which does no more than enact the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, either set aside or grossly diminished in its standing. A bill of rights is worthless if it does not stand as a firm limit on the other branches of government. The current hostility towards the Bill of Rights does nothing to reassure Hong Kong people. On the face of it the Bill of Rights is consistent with the Basic Law. To say that it is not is to put the Basic Law in direct conflict with the Joint Declaration which requires implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right. Therefore, an attitude of hostility to the Bill of Rights is grounds for grave concern about the human rights guarantees in the Basic Law and adherence to the Joint Declaration. On top of this concern, the threat of applying national laws on subversion and public order hangs over Hong Kong under Basic Law Article 18, if there is deemed to be ''turmoil'' in the region. Furthermore, recent threats that the Bill of Rights is a haven for ''bad guys'' are no help. Under our system a bill of rights is a haven for bad guys or any other ''guys'' whose rights are violated. The current spirit of interpretation concerning human rights clearly raises the spectre of non-convergence with the Joint Declaration. It is little comfort in this environment that the Basic Law also protects rights. On the rule of law front, the area of judicial review of legislation for compliance with the Basic Law is another area where the Basic Law seems to exceed the requirements of the Joint Declaration. This is another area where interpretation of the Basic Law's requirements in a liberal manner could alleviate most of the concerns. But, again, the current indications are contrary. While the Joint Declaration requires maintenance of judicial independence and finality, continuance of the common law system and, generally, preservation of the rule of law, the Basic Law, as now interpreted by some members of the PWC, would have the NPCStanding Committee and its subservient bodies meddling at every stage. The current atmosphere seems to point to the central government taking unilateral charge of most questions of interpretation with little regard for local interest, the rule of law or the Joint Declaration. We are told, again by China's local bodies made up of people who want to form the first SAR government, that they will review all the laws of Hong Kong, that they will vet legislators, that they will locate subversives, all without the aid of the courts of law. They will even set up new courts independent of the current system if necessary. Here the provisions are liberally construed against the Joint Declaration. The parties are not free to strike any deal they please. They are required to monitor compliance with the existing one. Can anyone seriously believe this situation reflects adherence to the Joint Declaration? These three ''non-convergences'' and any others must be viewed very seriously. The author is Senior Lecturer in Law, Chinese University