As Ariel Sharon departs the political stage, he leaves behind a debate over whether his five-year tenure as prime minister has brought peace between Israelis and Palestinians closer, or made it more remote. Mr Sharon is being gradually brought out of a medically induced coma after suffering a massive stroke last week. He is expected to have suffered some cognitive damage that will make his return to office impossible. The acting prime minister, Ehud Olmert, is expected to lead the country until the March 28 elections. Beginning with his brutal cross-border army raids in the 1950s, through his leading of Israel's counter-attack against Egypt in the 1973 Middle East war, and continuing with his planting of settlements in occupied territory as a government minister from 1977 and the bloody and costly invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Ariel Sharon made history - for better or worse. But it is the import of his last major undertaking - the withdrawal of settlements from the Gaza Strip last summer - that is at the heart of the debate over his legacy. Those who believe Mr Sharon made peace more likely see the unilateral Gaza withdrawal and dismantling of 21 settlements there as a historic step towards the Israeli concessions necessary for an agreement, namely withdrawal from Palestinian territories occupied during the 1967 Middle East war. In domestic political terms, they see Mr Sharon as having dealt a devastating blow to the once far-reaching power of ideology in Israeli politics. 'In his last term, Sharon did something very big indeed,' said Israeli analyst Leslie Susser. 'He created a precedent of unilateral withdrawal which seems to be a possible way of reaching an accommodation in the future.' Traditionally, Israel was divided between a left-wing that favoured territorial concessions and a right-wing that opposed them on the grounds that all of what it considered the historic Land of Israel should be under Israeli control. But in breaking with Likud, and forming the Kadima party in October, Mr Sharon drew politicians of both left- and right-wing backgrounds prepared to support further withdrawals. 'Sharon broke the historic deadlock,' Mr Susser said. 'He took a chunk of the right-wing and moved it to the centre, which can form an alliance with the left and continue the policy of partitioning the land.' But the question is what type of partitioning they have in mind. Unilateral withdrawal, it can be argued, should not be confused with peace. 'Sharon did not believe in peace,' said Yossi Alpher, former director of the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv. 'He did not believe our neighbours are able to live in peace with us. So he didn't make concessions for peace. Part of his legacy is the rejection of peace as a track Israel should make serious concessions for.' When the peace blueprint known as the roadmap was issued in 2003, calling for the establishment of a viable Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel, Mr Sharon raised 14 objections that negated all of its main points. The ninth objection flatly ruled out any discussion with Palestinians on issues related to a final status settlement. If the 14 objections - which the US agreed to 'fully and seriously' address - remain the policy of Mr Sharon's successor, there will be no negotiations but rather an attempt at further plans with Washington that determine the Palestinians' future without a Palestinian voice. Writing in Haaretz newspaper on Monday, dovish commentator Akiva Eldar argued that Mr Sharon's departure from the political scene 'should serve as an opportunity to re-examine the idea that there is no [Palestinian] partner'. Eldar wrote that Mr Sharon used assassinations, barrier building, movement restrictions and unilateral withdrawal during his tenure. 'Only one thing was not tried during that period: a diplomatic process with the new Palestinian leadership headed by Mahmoud Abbas.' However, to be a viable partner Mr Abbas will have to solve grave domestic difficulties, including security chaos and an electoral challenge from Hamas, the radical Islamist resistance movement that calls for Israel's destruction and has spearheaded a suicide bombing campaign. The flip side of Mr Sharon's refusal to negotiate with Mr Abbas and making him irrelevant in the eyes of Palestinians has been the growing power of Hamas, with its argument that Israelis understand only force. Hamas has been saying in the run-up to the January 25 elections that it was its armed attacks that forced the dismantling of the 21 Gaza settlements, as opposed to the Palestinian Authority's efforts at negotiations, which, Hamas points out, have never removed a single settlement. One big question on the Israeli side is whether Mr Olmert or other heirs of Mr Sharon will have the same popularity, clout and capacity to make concessions in a peace agreement, or alternatively to implement further unilateral withdrawals in the West Bank. In pushing through the Gaza withdrawal, Mr Sharon showed a combination of determination and political deftness, defying a Likud party referendum vote against the withdrawal and even sacking ministers to gain a majority in the cabinet. Precisely because he was the one who established the settlements to begin with and because he was the arch-hawk in Israeli politics, Mr Sharon was able to successfully override all opposition in a step that would have been far more tumultuous had it come from any other Israeli leader. Mr Sharon never clearly explained his motives for the Gaza withdrawal, but he is believed to have been influenced by a realisation that the 8,000 Jewish settlers there had no future because they were so outnumbered by the 1.3 million Palestinians. Critics believe the pullout was a ruse to enable Israel to stave off pressure for negotiations and annex parts of the West Bank, where settlements have continued to expand alongside the building of the separation barrier inside occupied territory. Mr Olmert, Mr Sharon's close ally in carrying out the Gaza withdrawal, is on record as saying further unilateral withdrawals should be undertaken in the West Bank to ensure that Israel can simultaneously be a democracy and a Jewish state. While holding on to what Mr Olmert termed 'the central part of the settlements' in the West Bank, Israel should try to set final borders that encompass a maximum number of Jews with a minimum number of Arabs, he said. Mr Olmert argued that drawing the borders unilaterally would enable Israel to hold on to more territory than a negotiated settlement would. Azmi Shueibi, a Palestinian legislator, believes that Mr Olmert might nevertheless steer Israel back towards negotiations if the Israeli elections result in a coalition between Kadima and the Labour Party, which supports resuming talks with the Palestinian Authority on Jerusalem, refugees, borders and other thorny issues. 'Sharon did not think of the Palestinian side, he thought only of the Israeli side,' Mr Shueibi said. 'But he destroyed the red lines of the Likud [against yielding territory] and we might now have an atmosphere that is more suitable for the Palestinians.' He said that there was no unequivocal answer to the question of whether Mr Sharon's tenure as prime minister had made Israeli-Palestinian peace more or less likely. 'His history with the Palestinians was black, but we cannot ignore that he changed his opinion [on territory],' Mr Shueibi said. 'Still, it would be wrong to describe him as a DeGaulle. His approach was unilateral. He did not think of the Palestinian side, only of the Israeli side.' Hani Masri, a candidate for the Palestinian parliamentary elections and a veteran political analyst, predicts that Israel will continue in the path of unilateral steps and will refrain from negotiating with the Palestinians. 'There could be political instability in Israel, but there won't be a basic change in the Israeli programme, because Sharon's idea of imposing an interim solution on the Palestinians has many followers,' he said.