Playing out the 'Great Game'

EARLIER this year, Governor Chris Patten started talking publicly and confidently about internal splits in the Chinese leadership over policy towards Hong Kong. His statements were aimed at giving him the upper hand in his continuing battle with Beijing and driving a wedge of doubt, suspicion and uncertainty between his adversaries in Beijing and in the territory. In the constant ebb and flow of Sino-British negotiations he may have gained some leverage by catching them wrong-footed in the hope of gaining valuable ground at the bargaining table. But was this political brinkmanship or an astute move backed by information of China's negotiating position culled through intelligence? Politically, and to some extent militarily, Hong Kong and China have become the focus of British and United States intelligence services, which generally share information of the region. A continually ticking global intelligence machine gathers, intercepts and assesses everything from takeaway orders to potentially crucial information from a host of agents, ''along siders'' or unpaid informers and signal sources. The brunt of the information comes from a shadowy establishment organisation known in intelligence circles as ''Box''. Better known by the public as MI6, or officially, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), it co-ordinates and provides ''assessments'' to its political master, who in Hong Kong is the Governor. The SIS and MI5, the electronic eavesdropping agency, GCHQ, and the Defence Ministry, form the main sources of political, economic, military and national security information given to senior British politicians. The SIS also specialises in monitoring weapons of mass destruction. This has included China's sale of M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan. Vital intelligence is also gained from high-ranking ''defectors'' such as Xu Jiatun, the former director of Xinhua (the New China News Agency) in Hong Kong, during lengthy ''debriefing'' interrogations. As Governor, Mr Patten enjoys the same access to these intelligence assessments as British Prime Minister John Major. ''It is always an assessment,'' one former intelligence agent said. ''The same briefing that goes to the prime minister is the same level as that to Patten.'' He said it was ''routine'' to use British businessmen to gather information and that under changes to overall policy, MI5 had approval to follow cases outside the UK and in the patch normally covered by the SIS. All intelligence goes through a ''mill'', whose job it is to produce accurate assessments. With all the information gathered by the security services the Governor works out plans and forms policy. There is no room for inaccurate assessments. With the clock ticking and a little more than three years to go before China regains sovereignty of Hong Kong, Mr Patten has to get it right. Last week, China declared Mr Patten's decision to table legislation for some of the reforms proposed for the 1994 and 1995 elections would mean the end of negotiations on the territory's political future. How much of that decision was based on intelligence assessments on China's perceived response may never be made public, but without question the Governor would have received some sort of input from both Hong Kong and London. And when senior Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping dies, one of the first people to be informed of his death will be the Governor. Mr Patten is advised by the highly sensitive Local Intelligence Committee (LIC), composed of Secretary for Security Alastair Asprey, and Commander British Forces, Major General John Foley. These two people, who pass on assessments from military intelligence and other sources, are the local equivalent of the British Government's influential Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The heads of the SIS, MI5, GCHQ and the JIC have all been named recently in an attempt to lift the veil of secrecy from the intelligence-gathering agencies. Pauline Neville-Jones is the new chairman of the JIC, which is made up of officials from the intelligence services and key ministries, including the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Treasury. She is also in charge of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat in the cabinet office. One of Ms Neville-Jones' principal roles is to provide ministers, and Mr Patten, with a weekly summary of intelligence, known as the Red Book, which includes a section on political, economic and logistical briefs. Mr Patten also attends the Governor's Security Committee, which meets ''at need'' - normally on a monthly basis - and is made up of predominantly customs, police and military officials. In spite of the British Government's new ''open'' approach to spying, it is doubtful if any of the information - or roles played by agents - will be declassified. For instance, ''bugging'' the Happy Valley headquarters of Xinhua is well within the capabilities of both equipment and people, and provides a staple diet of bread and butter intelligence. A former SIS agent in Hong Kong, Brian Stewart, who was interviewed on a BBC Panorama programme shown here last week, merely smiled when asked if ''bugging'' was used to obtain information. But the method, used by most governments, is known to the Chinese, and all employees are warned their phones are tapped. How many of their secret signals to Beijing and Guangdong remain hidden from the listeners at GCHQ's Chung Hom Kok complex is unknown. The fact the facility will be removed from Hong Kong before 1997 points to its value. Whatever the outcome of the current political machinations, the ''Great Game'' is set to continue in Hong Kong until 1997 and beyond, when it is almost certain a new venue and a new target will be found.