The blast heard across Europe
It is three years since the Madrid train bombings - the first Islamist terror attack staged in Europe - and thus an appropriate moment to evaluate Europe's experience with al-Qaeda since that dark day.
Madrid was a marker in the history of radical Islamist terror, and a catalyst for change in European policy towards global terrorism. It represented the first tangible proof of a new form of radical Islamist terrorism.
Across the continent, states that had not felt al-Qaeda was their problem now had to reassess that assumption. Cross-European co-operation in counter-terror and intelligence work, which before had been surprisingly limited, quickly became a top priority.
With the trial of the suspects under way, the attacks continue to be an open sore in Spanish political and social life. In particular, the role of al-Qaeda in the attacks has become an issue for scrutiny, debate and conspir- acy theories.
Some right-wing Spanish politi- cians and media outlets continue to champion the theory that the attacks were a grand conspiracy between Spanish socialists, national and foreign agents, and Basque separa- tists.
In less conspiratorial terms, this general debate has become promin- ent in the European and international counterterrorism community, as the media and the public - after every attack and broken plot - demand to know 'was this the work of al-Qaeda'?
The question is increasingly difficult to answer, however, in part because Osama bin Laden's group does not exist as a cohesive, centrally structured organisation. It remains a key ideological inspirer, and tries to exert as strong an operational influe- nce as possible. But as the years pass, its attacks and cell structures are increasingly the work of the localised, more independent adaptations of the al-Qaeda family.
Some attacks today are entirely independent. Others are carried out by local elements operating largely independently, but sometimes in re- action to orders or suggestions from a central leader.
While such operations can undoubtedly be blamed on al-Qaeda, they differ sharply from the massive scale of attacks like 9/11 - and the prevailing public perception of how the group operates.
Since Madrid, London has been hit, while attacks have been averted across Europe from Germany to Den- mark. All these involved local, home- grown militants, in many cases target- ing states where they had lived all their lives. The choice of targets, too, is rap- idly changing: that is best illustrated by the growing evidence that France - a country that has strongly distanced itself from America's 'war on terror' - is now in al-Qaeda's sights.
According to a leaked secret French report, published last month by the Arab newspaper Al-Hayat, al-Qaeda is planning to repeat the 'Spanish scenario' by attacking France during the upcoming presidential election campaign.
For western countries, especially European nations with sizeable Mus- lim populations, this movement towards home-grown terrorism repre- sents both good and bad news. It's good news because, without central planning and significant resources, large-scale attacks are becoming less likely. But it's bad news because the terrorists are now hiding behind regular lives in western states, recrui- ting young Muslim martyrs who feel disenfranchised and alienated.
At the EU summit last week, terrorism was not nearly as prominent on the agenda as it was just a couple of years ago. But this should not be confused with complacency: Euro- pean governments and the EU are all too aware how quickly terrorists can return to the forefront of the agenda.
No one is in any doubt that Europe will be targeted again, and sooner rather than later.
Hagai Segal, a terrorism and Middle-East specialist, lectures at New York University in London
