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A military pledge too far for Washington

The diplomatic food fight between Russia and Estonia over the latter's removal of a Soviet war memorial should be an issue Americans can safely ignore. But because Washington successfully pressed its Nato allies into admitting Estonia and the other two Baltic republics into the alliance, the US has a treaty obligation to defend those tiny nations on Russia's border if Moscow resorts to force. It is an unwise, extremely dangerous commitment. As American trade with Asia increases by leaps and bounds, and China and India grow to great power, the Baltics are the last place the US needs to assert itself.

Most American proponents of Nato's eastward enlargement act as though the transatlantic alliance is little more than a political honour society. Their logic is that, because eastern European nations have become capitalist democracies, they deserve to be members of the west's most prominent club. And because Nato is now primarily a political body, so the argument goes, Moscow has no reason to fear or oppose its expansion.

But as the Estonia episode should remind us, Nato is still a military alliance with serious US obligations. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty proclaims that an attack on one member is an attack on all. And even worse, those obligations go on forever. Therein lies the danger. True, in the near term, there is little risk of a clash with Russia. But who would dare predict the political environment in Russia a generation from now? All it would take to trigger a crisis is a Russian president who tires of the Baltic republics' treatment of their Russian inhabitants as second-class citizens and decides to rectify that situation, by force if necessary.

Although Moscow would probably first use economic pressure to force a change in policy, nationalist emotions inside Russia could lead to an adoption of military measures.

Indeed, a crisis could result if a future Russian president concludes that Nato's mere presence in the Baltic region is an intolerable intrusion into Moscow's sphere of influence. Russian concerns on that score have been exacerbated by the efforts of the Baltic states to have Nato combat aircraft deployed in their territory. As Russia's economic and military recovery progresses, its determination to stand up to the US and western allies is likely to grow.

That is why permanent US security obligations are so unwise. The commitments may make sense - or at least seem innocuous - under one set of conditions, but they can become disastrous liabilities when conditions change.

When permanent commitments are made to strategically and economically irrelevant clients, the folly is compounded. The security pledges to Estonia and the other Baltic republics are a prime example. If the US commitment were ever challenged, Washington would face a choice between a bad and a worse outcome. It could renege on its obligations, devastating American credibility and casting doubt on US security commitments and statements elsewhere in the world. Or, even worse, the US could carry out its pledge, which could easily lead to a clash with a nuclear power. America should never incur that degree of risk except in the defence of its most vital security interests. The security of three tiny nations on Russia's border does not even come close to meeting that test.

Washington should seriously consider eliminating Article 5. If Nato is now meant to be primarily a political organisation, as its supporters contend, there should be little objection. Conversely, if Nato supporters demand that Article 5 be maintained, then their assurances that the alliance is not directed against Russia are disingenuous and we can expect serious tensions with that country in the future.

In any case, the US should never have made military commitments to these republics. These obligations are a dangerous liability, and the US must extricate itself from them.

Ted Galen Carpenter is vice-president for defence and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute

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