Chief executive's high-wire balancing act
Twenty years ago, the British governor of Hong Kong, Sir David Wilson, published a green paper to consult the public on representative government.
The ostensible purpose was to see if the public wanted direct elections to be held in 1988. The real purpose was to justify a decision already made by the government not to hold such elections.
Now, Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen has taken a page from the Wilson handbook in the publication of his green paper - but with a difference. The pan-democratic camp is calling for universal suffrage in 2012, but there seems little doubt the central government has ruled out universal suffrage in those elections. So one purpose of the green paper is to justify the decision not to introduce universal suffrage in 2012.
Both in 1987 and now, the Hong Kong government acted in such a manner because of Beijing. In 1987, China made it clear to Britain that direct elections should not be introduced until after the publication of the Basic Law in 1990, because whatever the British did in Hong Kong before 1997 had to 'converge' with China's plans for Hong Kong after 1997.
The chief executive has, in the green paper, set out all the relevant provisions in the Basic Law, including four principles contained in that document on constitutional development. Among those principles is that of 'gradual and orderly progress'.
Mr Tsang had led people to believe that the green paper would present three models for universal suffrage from which the public could choose.
This top-down approach, which perhaps would have made the green paper more comprehensible, was abandoned for a bottom-up approach in which the public is asked to make decisions on virtually all relevant issues.
Although this makes the green paper harder to digest, it is a more democratic approach.
The chief executive has been attacked for not fighting for universal suffrage in 2012. Actually, it must be recognised that he has an impossible job because the Basic Law makes him accountable to the central government as well as to the special administrative region. He therefore has to perform a high-wire balancing act and cannot be seen to be opposed to Beijing.
While the Basic Law provides for the Legislative Council, the chief executive and the central government to all agree before there can be a move to universal suffrage, in practice Beijing has the upper hand because it is in a position to veto anything proposed by Hong Kong.
The job of the chief executive, therefore, is to try to find a compromise solution acceptable to both a two-thirds majority in Legco and to the central government. If those two parties agree, it is inconceivable that Mr Tsang will not give his consent.
Given that situation, the present green paper is a useful tool. Mr Tsang can use the outcome of this public consultation to draw up a model that has at least 60 per cent popular support.
It will be difficult for the various groups in the legislature, all of which claim to represent public opinion, to oppose a 'mainstream' model if it is demonstrably supported by the public.
And, so long as Mr Tsang stays within the confines laid down by the central government, the 'mainstream' proposal may find acceptance in Beijing as well.
But if Mr Tsang is to carry this off, he will have to see to it that the public truly understands the restraints that Hong Kong is operating under.
No solution is going to satisfy fully all the parties concerned.
But for a compromise model to successfully emerge from this consultation process, all parties concerned - including Beijing - will have to be willing to accept something short of perfection.
Frank Ching is a Hong Kong-based writer and commentator.
