Caught in Iraq - the dilemma of withdrawal
A key event occurred in Iraq last week, a marker in the country's shift from dependence on outside protectors to being able to police itself. US President George W. Bush made a surprise visit to Iraq on Sunday, September 2, carefully timed to precede the release of official US reports on his policies for the country. But the key event was the withdrawal of British troops, at the same time, from their central base in Basra city.
Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick Sanders, the co-ordinator of the British withdrawal, argues it is nonsense to suggest that the Basra redeployment was a defeat. Rather, it's proof of success, he said: Britain was doing what had always been intended - handing Basra city over to local Iraqi forces.
Confidence in these Iraqi troops is clearly not strong, however, and for good reason - considering their performance to date. They are slowly improving, but remain relatively inexperienced, low-skilled and used to working under American and British guidance.
The Basra withdrawal is, nevertheless, an important example of the issues facing policymakers responsible for troop levels in Iraq. While some US allies have already withdrawn their entire troop contingents, other key allies - Britain, South Korea and Japan - are reducing their troop levels ahead of their own complete withdrawals.
Yet the policing of Iraq, an endeavour that remains an enormous and costly undertaking, continues to require a huge foreign physical presence. The current US 'surge' has brought the number of American troops in Iraq to 160,000 - over 10,000 more than were deployed to defeat the Iraqi army in 2003. And while even the United States itself begins to plan its eventual departure, the current scale of the foreign presence suggests that the troops are needed on the ground as much as ever.
The huge challenge thus remains how to withdraw troops while providing the essential physical presence on the ground that Iraq will require for some time yet. One solution is that the Iraqis themselves will take up the slack, but this certainly has not worked so far. The other is to internationalise the policing role.
This, however, seems equally unlikely. While the UN and many states are keen to adopt a role in Iraq, the notion of deploying offensive troops in the country is deeply unpalatable to most. All nations are aware of the resources that would have to be committed, and the casualty rates that would undoubtedly follow.
Thus, while considering withdrawal, US policymakers are already pondering how it could be achieved in a manner that won't be seen as a surrender and an al-Qaeda victory. To this end, the US is taking a long, hard look at the precedents set by its ally Israel.
Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 was a unilateral move, undertaken with huge public support and from what Israel felt was a position of strength. But, as the pullout was done at great speed and under Hezbollah fire, its enemy was able to claim a victory.
When it left the Gaza Strip in 2005, however, Israel did so following a massive offensive against Hamas. Its forces were not under attack as they departed, and thus were able to redeploy without the perception - locally and internationally - of defeat.
The US and its allies will be determined to ensure that their withdrawals from Iraq is more Gaza 2005, and less Lebanon 2000.
Regarding the British presence, Colonel Sanders said last week: 'We're not necessarily in the endgame but, to paraphrase Churchill, it's the beginning of the end.'
Even so, it's clear that the troops won't all be home by Christmas, and most US troops won't be home for next year's festivities, either.
As important as the British pullout from Basra may have been, the emphasis should clearly be on 'the beginning', not 'the end'. The Iraq adventure will continue for some time yet.
Hagai Segal, a terrorism and Middle-East specialist, lectures at New York University in London
