South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun is clearly looking forward to his first face-to-face meeting with North Korea's 'Dear Leader' Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang this week. But it still isn't clear what the two leaders will talk about. Just as the process leading up to the announcement of the meeting was kept secret so, too, is the agenda. In this case, however, it could be because there has yet to be a true meeting of minds about what will, and won't, be discussed. This is hard to accept or understand, from a US perspective. Recall that the proposed summit between Mr Kim and then-US president Bill Clinton in 2000 failed to materialise in large part because the North would not clarify the 'deliverables' - or outcomes - in advance.
Mr Roh seems all too willing to accept the North's approach of 'trust us, it will be a good meeting' - one that no US president would (or should) ever accept. This makes a lot of South Koreans and Americans very nervous. One can be pretty sure that Mr Kim has a firm idea of what he wants to get out of the meeting. Does Mr Roh?
On the surface, Mr Roh's motives and objectives seem relatively transparent: he is looking to build his legacy. While it is doubtful that even the most diplomatically successful effort will garner him a Nobel Prize - as the first North-South summit, in June 2000, did for his predecessor Kim Dae-jung - it could still be a feather in his cap. Similarly, not having a face-to-face meeting with Kim Jong-il would be seen as falling short of his stated objectives.
No doubt Mr Roh wants to give his fellow 'progressives' a boost in December's presidential election. Progress in North-South relations, or at least the appearance of it, would help in that regard. Mr Kim no doubt sympathises with, and shares, that objective.
Pyongyang has made no secret of its disdain and distrust of the opposition Grand National Party (GNP), whose candidate Lee Myung-bak remains far ahead of any potential rivals from the ruling party camp - the actual candidate hasn't been chosen yet.
One has to suspect that a key reason for Pyongyang agreeing to the meeting now is to give the pro-engagement camp a boost. This does not imply, by the way, that the GNP is anti-engagement. It isn't, but it would insist on more reciprocity and much better terms than the current administration.
No doubt there are also economic motivations. While Pyongyang cannot expect to get another secret cheque - like the one for US$500 million that accompanied the 2000 summit - there is talk of a US$20 billion economic incentive package being among the gifts Mr Roh will take to the North. Given the failed nature of the North Korean state, every little bit helps, and US$20 billion is considerably more than a little bit.