bodyType

customContents

entityId

entityUuid

articlePageQuery

filter

article

articleBaseAdvertisingInfoArticle

articleListArticle

articleSeoArticle

helpersCheckIsPostiesArticle

hooksArticleAcknowledgementGateOverlayArticle

hooksTrackPageViewArticle

hooksContentInterestArticle

articleLinkingDataContent

articleSchemaContent

liveArticle

advertZone

sentiment

contentLock

topics

types

sections

moreOnThisArticles

urlAlias

commentCount

sponsorType

authorLocations

authors

paywallTypes

corrections

displaySlideShow

multimediaEmbed

printHeadline

seriesContainer

socialHeadline

headline

flag

firstTopic

glossary

flattenTypeIds

publishedDate

additionalInfoBoxes

images

image

relatedLinks

relatedNewsletters

__typename

createdDate

sponsor

factSheets

series

disableOffPlatformContent

published

updatedDate

summary

subHeadline

body

keywords

copyrighted

customTimezone

liveContents

Tim Hamlett

War and Anti-War by Alvin and Heidi Toffler Little Brown $230 THIS is the latest offering from Mr and Mrs Toffler, who have already given us the Third Wave, Future Shock, and other useful cliches.

  Here the Third Wave, and the theories which go with it, are applied to military matters, an interesting idea though not a complete success.

  Toffling (clearly the only possible verb for what Tofflers do) involves sketching a grand theory which sums up the whole of human history in a few paragraphs.

  This can be elaborated and varied in a stream of books, making the toffler rich and famous and his disciples valued advisers of business, industry, the media etc.

  There are a two simple rules for toffling. One is that the theorist should cover such a huge sweep of history that the professionals - who tend to be specialists - are not offended by the intrusion.

  The second is that the theory must discern a crucial change taking place in the present. Otherwise nobody will be interested.

  Traditional tofflers like Spengler, Toynbee and Kennedy diagnosed imminent decline. Third Wave theory is refreshing and innovative in being more optimistic.

  The theory is engagingly simple. The first wave was the invention of settled agriculture. The second was our old friend the Industrial Revolution. The third is the arrival of huge increases in the capacity to store, move and handle information.

  The three definitive inventions are the farm, the factory and the microchip.

  The proper test of a new toffle is not whether it holds up as an overall structure (about which the argument can be endless) but whether it helps people to make sense of what they could not make sense of before.

  In this sense the Third Wave has been a resounding success. It explains, and celebrates, the de-industrialisation of advanced countries, the disappearance in many areas of economies of scale, the rise of services, the changes in manufacturing technique and style which have so baffled people like General Motors.

  So far so good. In 1982 the Tofflers were taken up (it is clear that the initiative was that way round) by a group of American generals who were seeking to change the way their army fought. They were working on what is now known as the Airland Battle system, and is the official approach of the US Army. They thought that this could be presented as Third Wave warfare - a logical way to harness technological change to military requirements.

  The Tofflers were, naturally, charmed by this notion, and went along with it. As a result we can say with some confidence that the Third Wave theory has already performed a useful military function: it has provided an interesting new way of persuading Congress to pay for a variety of useful gadgets.

  As a way of explaining changes in the art of war in the 20th century, however, it is a complete failure.

  The Airland system is summarised for us - close air and land co-ordination, deep strikes at communications and reinforcements, the tactical offensive as an ingredient in the defence, more initiative for the lower ranks and great emphasis on the importance of information.

  This is admirable stuff, but there is nothing new in it. Many of the essentials recall blitzkrieg. One quite understands why this was not a thought considered suitable for Congressional hearings. The offensive as a part of the defensive is in Clausewitz,who wrote in the 1830s. The importance of information is a key concept of Sun Tsu, who wrote in the third century BC.

  What we are seeing here is not a new wave of military thought, but another instalment in the traditional struggle between the Classicists - who say there is no substitute for toe-to-toe slogging at the enemy's forces - and the romantics - who say that avoiding such sanguine approaches by the use of indirection, surprise or technical ingenuity is the highest art of generalship.

  We are offered the Gulf War as Third Wave warfare in action, making mincemeat of a Second Wave army just as Second Wave armies used to mangle First Wave ones.

  The decisive weapon of the future is the computer. This may, or may not, be so, as it is a conclusion jumped to on the basis of one war.

    In the second half of the book, the Tofflers move into the safer territory of the future and what it will look like. We are offered a variety of theories, some fascinating, some terrifying. Some of them are difficult to believe. In these fast-changing days that is probably to their credit.

  This is a stimulating book which will provide valuable ideas to anyone who is interested in current technical developments and where they may lead. As a study of military thought it illustrates the need for those who wish to foretell the future to look carefully, first, at the past.



Tofflers on manoeuvres