Thaksin Shinawatra's flight from justice to London via the Beijing Olympics raises fascinating questions, particularly whether his departure will allow Thailand to take some toddler steps towards fulfilling its immense potential as a modern economy with a democratic form of government. I should start with a declaration of interest. I went to Bangkok in the early 2000s to edit a tiny daily English-language business paper. We made exciting but frustrating progress in reporting on one of the world's best-endowed but problem-filled countries, until shortly after the 2005 election won overwhelmingly by Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai party. My proprietor, who had previously worked for Thaksin, quarrelled with him, before making up and again becoming a golfing buddy, was visited by the prime minister's close supporters who declared that they wanted to put me into prison - no mention of charges or a trial first - for 'unbalanced election coverage'. Our outrage was interviewing an opposition economics professor who raised pertinent questions about government policies. We tried in vain to get a similar interview with a government minister. Over my protests about the importance of press freedom and the nonsense of the charges, my proprietor shouted angrily: 'You're effing useless; get out of my sight.' The answer to the question about Thailand after Thaksin is that it is too early to say. He still has his supporters - and cynical opponents - who hope, or fear, that the deposed former leader will reappear using the magic of his name and his money to regain power as prime minister or, perhaps, as president of Thailand when the world's longest-living but ailing monarch, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, dies. Evidently, Thaksin has recognised that his name and his considerable money, even with US$2 billion frozen by the Thai authorities, are not as powerful as they once were. Having gone to Beijing for the opening ceremonies of the Olympic Games, he decided it was safer to fly to London than face a court in Bangkok to answer corruption charges. He tried to explain his flight, and maybe to prepare the way for a request for political asylum in Britain, by issuing a hand-written note claiming that there was a conspiracy against him, that he could never get justice and feared for his life. This was a strange turnaround from the Thaksin who returned to Thailand from exile in February after being toppled by a military coup in September 2006. Then he fell on his knees and kissed the home ground, and was confident that, with the backing of the new sympathetic government containing many of his own supporters, he would be able to fight the corruption charges against him. He hired a battery of lawyers, yet at the end of July his wife was convicted of dodging taxes on share transfers and sentenced to three years in prison. Thaksin, facing a string of corruption cases himself, saw that the judges were no longer the pushover they previously were. Although Thai cynics say the country has the best judges that money can buy, in recent high-profile cases they have been studying the evidence line by line before deciding. If Thaksin is no longer a factor, immense political problems remain. The election this year produced a government widely regarded as his banned Thai Rak Thai party reincarnated, with new prime minister Samak Sundaravej popularly seen as a puppet of Thaksin. Mr Samak has evidently been more of his own man than anyone imagined, especially Thaksin. But he still heads a fractious and dysfunctional government, with many ministers with few qualifications apart from being Thaksin supporters who were not among the 111 banned along with Thai Rak Thai. To stay in power, Mr Samak has to purge his government and find capable lieutenants loyal to him. That may be beyond him, and indeed some commentators predict a return to the politics of the 1980s and 1990s when corrupt political barons formed uneasy and constantly shifting alliances that shared power with the vested interests of the royal court, the bureaucracy and the military. This time, the government faces rivalry not only in parliament but on the streets from the self-styled People's Democratic Alliance, a coalition of anti-Thaksin forces sporting the colours of the monarchy and the urban middle class that has been demonstrating daily against the government's Thaksin connections. If politics in Thailand is to become stable, then it needs to be taken from the streets and the military headquarters and back into parliament. Thaksin, like so many other leaders worldwide, contributed to the uselessness of parliament by behaving as if his election victories justified him in acting as a virtual dictator. Today Thailand is a more prosperous and complicated society than 20 or 30 years ago when it could be run by the fiats produced by meetings of politicians, bureaucrats and military. The military demonstrated this after the 2006 coup when it repeatedly bungled even the most simple decisions and set back economic growth by 2 per cent a year. Thailand is still underperforming below its potential. One reason is that as The Nation wrote in an editorial after Thaksin had fled: 'There are still too many crooks in our government and bureaucratic system.' Police can be seen on almost every street corner openly demanding bribes. Thaksin was right in his so-called populist agenda, though he was given undue credit for being the first to try to stimulate village development. Kukrit Pramoj did it 30 years ago without tying it to votes for his party. As to Thaksin himself, he is now a man on the run from justice, having failed to appear in court. If Thailand's courts convict him of corruption, the English football authorities may have no option but to re-examine whether he is a 'fit and proper' person to own Manchester City football club. That would also put the British government in a dilemma when it decides whether to give him refuge from a Thai extradition warrant. Kevin Rafferty was editor-in-chief of Business Day Bangkok