The crisis over Georgia has abated, but its ramifications will only increase. 'What of Ukraine?' ask people across Europe, and especially in Ukraine. When the Soviet Union broke up, thousands of nuclear weapons remained in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. One of America's principal foreign policy goals became disarming these inadvertent nuclear states.
The objective was valid, but there were countervailing foreign policy interests. As we have just seen with Georgia, the Soviet break-up did not necessarily result in final boundaries. The events of 1989 sowed the seeds of future conflict.
The removal of nuclear weapons from Belarus and Kazakhstan proceeded with minimal controversy. Ukraine was more complicated. The new nation had a population of 52 million and tore a huge hole in not just the Soviet Union but also what had been imperial Russia. Although independence sentiment long permeated western Ukraine, ethnic Russians, who make up about 20 per cent of the population, predominated in the south and east.
Moreover, the Crimea - in which 58 per cent of the people are ethnic Russians - only became part of Ukraine in 1954. When the Soviet Union broke up, Russians and many Crimeans believed Crimea should revert to Russia.
Despite their general euphoria at escaping from Soviet control, some Ukrainians perceived clouds on the horizon. And they believed that their unexpected nuclear force could act as a source of national pride and military security. Thus, the denuclearisation process stretched out for more than two years.
Today, Ukraine faces a resurgent Russia and, while an attempt at outright annexation seems unlikely, agitation by Russian nationalists about the Crimea grows louder.
President Viktor Yushchenko has warned: 'What has happened [in Georgia] is a threat to everyone.' Moreover, a split has developed between Mr Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, who appears to have become the government leader with whom Moscow can do business.