Chen Shui-bian is in custody; the 'son of Taiwan' has become the 'shame of Taiwan'. His case has led Hong Kong people to question the democratic system. His allegedly corrupt behaviour is, of course, a matter of personal conduct. But there are institutional factors behind such behaviour. The hysterical accusations from his daughter, Chen Hsin-yu, that all Democratic Progressive Party leaders had received money from her father naturally reflect problems in the electoral system.
Taiwan's electoral campaigns are extremely costly; this is a political fact recognised by the people. Campaign funds of political parties and candidates come mainly from business groups; this is the root cause of collusion between businessmen and politicians. Business groups making major donations to electoral campaigns naturally expect returns. It is an open secret in Taiwan that public-sector infrastructure projects involve substantial kickbacks.
When electoral campaign expenditure exceeds the legal limits, there will be all kinds of shady deals. Since they go unreported, there is no accountability and party leaders responsible for fund-raising could be easily corrupted.
The vast confidential state funds at the Taiwanese president's personal disposal are a legacy of earlier authoritarian regimes. They are also related to Taiwan's difficult diplomatic and security situation. The authorities spend substantial funds on intelligence gathering (especially against the mainland), overseas united-front activities, bribery to secure diplomatic relations, and the like. Such expenditure cannot be in the open; it is therefore controlled by the president alone. This gives rise to opportunities for corruption.
In many democracies, secret operations of intelligence agencies are monitored by oversight bodes such as America's bipartisan Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The monitoring process remains classified, but nonetheless it serves as an effective check-and-balance mechanism.
The US model may offer a useful point of reference for Taiwan. The key question is whether its political parties in the legislature have sufficient mutual trust and self-discipline to fairly monitor various types of covert activities on a confidential basis to create effective checks and balances. This is certainly an important test for a mature democratic system.
There is probably already adequate public support for the effective control of electoral campaign expenditure according to the law. The same conditions exist as in Hong Kong in the 1970s, when the Independent Commission Against Corruption was established.