Last week, the Civil Service Bureau finally produced a draft civil service code. It seeks to set out the core values and standards of conduct of civil servants and how they are expected to work with politically appointed officials under the expanded accountability system introduced in June. It will consider all comments on the draft, and issue the code in the first half of next year.
The draft code sets out six core values that all civil servants must uphold: commitment to the rule of law; honesty and integrity; objectivity and impartiality; political neutrality; accountability for decisions and actions; and dedication, professionalism and diligence. The retention of the two key values from earlier guidelines - namely, commitment to the rule of law and political neutrality - are particularly welcome. But the section on political neutrality needs further refinement to take account of the city's particular situation.
Political neutrality means that civil servants will serve the chief executive and the Hong Kong government of the day with total loyalty, no matter what their own political beliefs. This is proper, and it is set out clearly in the draft code. But the draft then qualifies 'political beliefs' as 'party political beliefs', making references to 'party political affiliations' and 'political party activities'. Such wording might have been transplanted from similar codes in other jurisdictions where party politics and regular rotation of ruling parties are the established order. But this is not the case here, where half our legislators do not belong to any party, while all have political affiliations of one sort or another. Hong Kong civil servants should uphold their political neutrality not just from political parties, but also from non-party or independent politicians. The present wording should therefore be refined.
My second concern is that the draft code has not taken sufficient account of the implications of the expanded accountability system. When there was only one layer of accountable officials, civil servants helped principal officials with their political duties. It was clearly understood that the former would follow the instructions of the latter, who shouldered the responsibility for such actions.
Now, with two additional layers in the political system, the draft code envisages that civil servants would be required to undertake politically sensitive tasks. It says that 'the principal official concerned should, in consultation with the relevant permanent secretary and undersecretary, critically consider the political sensitivity involved in the duty or task and decide who should take the lead'. But 'political sensitivity' is not defined in the code, and may therefore be interpreted according to the wishes of the principal official concerned. This concern is not theoretical, given the controversy over who should be held accountable for the delayed decision to arrange charter flights to Bangkok.
My last comment relates to the diminished role of the secretary for the civil service. Before the expansion of the accountability system, he or she was responsible for handling complaints from civil servants relating to all other principal officials. Where such complaints remained unresolved, the secretary for the civil service would put the case before the chief executive for a ruling. Under the draft code, if the secretary for the civil service cannot resolve the complaint, he should bring it to the attention of the chief secretary or financial secretary. In other words, the two senior non-civil-service principal officials would handle complaints relating to other principal officials or even to themselves - undermining the secretary for the civil service's authority.