The approval of the funding for the express rail-link project was never in doubt; filibustering tactics were only ever going to achieve a delay of two or three weeks. But the opposition will go on, and the political costs for the government have been unnecessarily high.
The administration's handling of the issue reflects certain blind spots on its part. From the early 1990s, following the Legislative Council's electoral reforms, the British administration recognised that it could no longer count on a safe majority in the legislature all the time.
The then-governor Sir David Wilson asked all bureau chiefs to do an assessment of every bill or request they would send to Legco. In this way, it was up to the top civil servants to ensure that the government had a majority in the legislature, through intensive lobbying if necessary.
This practice has been maintained. Top civil servants are now very experienced in both assessment and lobbying. As far as the express rail-link funding was concerned, support in Legco was not an issue. But the government had obviously not anticipated the strong opposition outside the legislature, as well as the general worsening of social disagreements.
At the final stage of the Legco deliberations, the entire team of ministers was mobilised. They sought the support of all interest groups that would benefit from the project, including business groups and labour unions, as well as the tourism, retail and construction sectors. As a result, they all adopted a high-profile stand in support of the project, ranging from rallies to full-page newspaper advertisements.
The administration of Donald Tsang Yam-kuen has become quite sophisticated in fighting 'public-opinion wars', and, undeniably, the advocates of the project enjoy a distinct edge in terms of public support. But the opposition camp will not give up, and there may well be more confrontations ahead.
