Indonesia's security forces are again celebrating a major coup against Islamist terrorism following their killing last week of Bali bomb mastermind and Islamist leader Dulmatin. It is the latest headline success by the Indonesians against regional militant Islamists - following the killing of Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and Malaysian al-Qaeda figure Noordin Mohamed Top in September last year - and has been greeted with quiet satisfaction by counter-terror professionals across the globe.
Dulmatin, an electronics and explosives expert nicknamed 'Genius' - trained by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and a planner of the 2002 Bali atrocities - was one of the region's 'Most Wanted'. Washington had even placed a US$10 million bounty on his head.
With Indonesian and other regional governments succeeding in recent years in weakening and diminishing JI and its capacity to deploy, Dulmatin recently broke off from JI to lead a splinter group intent on again launching frequent mass-casualty terror attacks on government and Western targets in Indonesia.
He was killed in a shootout along with what Indonesian authorities have described as two other senior members of JI. The case of Indonesia's recent successes should act as an exemplar for other governments in the region. While al-Qaeda and Islamist activity has markedly increased in recent years in, for example, the India-Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre, the previously near-constant Islamist threat in Indonesia has been dealt a huge blow of late.
The policy and strategy changes initiated by Jakarta since 2004 are proof that states facing significant internal security and stability threats from radical Islamists can turn things around if sophisticated, thoughtful and holistic strategies - as opposed to knee-jerk, populist responses to terror attacks - are instituted.
The Indonesian case study has also again shown the benefit - especially in Asia - of governments internationalising their response, and especially if they do so in a manner where their internal security is not provided by a more powerful state, but is rather supported and enhanced by partner states.
Pakistan has lost internal support and legitimacy from large sections of its own populace since it is seen as dictated to by the United States, and for seemingly having no say in the matter when the US attacks Islamists in Pakistani sovereign territory.
