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Andrew Salmon

A South Korean warship is shattered. Forty-six sailors are dead or missing. Suspicions point to the likelihood of an attack from North Korea. South Korea's public is seething.
So read the headlines. But the lack of a 'smoking gun' constrains policy options, be they military, economic or diplomatic. And even if forensic evidence implicating Pyongyang is discovered by investigators, Seoul's response is restrained by regional and geopolitical hard truths.
 'We are in the realm of no good policy options,' said Dan Pinkston, who heads the Seoul office of the International Crisis Group. 'But we have to do something.'
The South Korean corvette Cheonan sank after a mysterious explosion near disputed waters off North Korea on March 26.  Funerals for the crew were held Thursday amid displays of public emotion and promises of stern action.
 However, although South Korean officials have said a torpedo is the most likely cause, no direct evidence has yet been found proving North Korean involvement - and such evidence may never be found.
 Either way, a military response from Seoul looks like the least likely option.
 'No one in South Korea wants another Korean war,' said Thomas Hubbard, a former US ambassador to Seoul,  this week. 'There is very little support for the kind of retaliation that would escalate into even more violence on the peninsula.'
 With some pundits in the South opining that the sinking of the Cheonan may have been a response to a firefight in November in which a North Korean patrol boat was damaged, a loosening of southern rules of engagement would not be viable: The North appears ready to escalate much further, and faster than the South.
 A retaliatory strike on North Korean naval bases would be perilous. North Korean artillery is dug into cliff-side embrasures on the Yellow Sea  coast, and anti-shipping missiles are frequently tested. A commando raid, air or naval strike entail massive risk, and with the bases heavily defended, are not guaranteed success. Moreover, such a move could trigger a vortex of escalation.
 Economic retaliation is a possibility: South Korea, which imports seafood and certain niche food products from North Korea, is one of the few nations in the world which runs an annual trade deficit (estimated between US$100-200 million) with the hardline state. That trade could be cut without damaging local interests.
 South Korea's investment in the joint Kaesong Industrial Complex, an economic enclave inside North Korea where southern companies employ northern labour in manufacturing operations, is more sensitive. Although Kaesong is one of the few sources of hard currency remaining for sanction-wracked Pyongyang, it is also the last tangible result of  engagement with North Korea.
 Not only is its value symbolic, it is the only significant  South Korean business bridgehead in the North. South Koreans are concerned that resource-hungry China is acquiring too many assets in North Korea, a territory the South one day hopes to reunify with.
 The fact that thousands of North Korean workers are operating under  South Korean managers at Kaesong,  learning the basics of capitalistic commerce, adds further value. 'I think it is subversive in North Korea,' Pinkston said. 'It will contribute to the undermining of their system.'
 On the diplomatic front,  Seoul has floated the idea of going to the UN Security Council if evidence against North Korea turns up. However, the UN is already heavily sanctioning North Korea, and one permanent member of the Security Council is likely to quash any harder line. China - North Korea's major ally and trade partner - is a key player. But despite China's ever-closer economic engagement with the wider world, the strategic imperative of maintaining North Korea as a buffer state on its eastern flank remains a historical constant.
 'I don't think we can rely on Chinese to do very much even if there is conclusive evidence the North Koreans are behind this,' said David Straub,  assistant director of Korean Studies at Stanford University's Asia Pacific Research Centre.
 'There is an increasing diversity of expert opinion in China,' added John Delury,  assistant director of the Center of China-US relations. 'But while they have allowed debate to open up, and clearly want to give room for advisers to explore options, [North Korean] policy itself is fairly consistent.'
 Meanwhile, there are concerns in South Korea that a hardline stance by most of the world could push Pyongyang  ever further into Beijing's arms.
 'By using the leverage of international criticism, China's government is likely to increase its influence over Pyongyang,' said Dr Ohn Dae-won  at the Hankook University of Foreign Studies.  
'At the same time, there could be some discreet bargaining between Pyongyang and Beijing.'
 One result of international pressure on China to get tough on North Korea may result in Beijing pressing Pyongyang to rejoin the   six-party denuclearisation talks, experts say.
 Still, Seoul does have some options that fall outside the  economic, strategic and military frameworks.
 Crisis Group's Pinkston suggested Seoul get fully active in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative, under which ships suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction or strategic materials are halted and boarded on the high seas. Thus far, South Korea has resisted this step for fear of further provoking North Korea.
 Pinkston also expected South Korea to strengthen its own military capabilities, especially surveillance.
 'Our response should include the measures North Korean most dislikes,' said Baek Sung-joo of the Korea Institute for Defence Analysis.  'For example, providing outside information inside North Korea on a systematic, regular basis.'
 Pyongyang has reacted furiously when South Korean activists have floated balloons with subversive messages attached across its borders. And NGOs have suggested sending short wave radios over the border, so that ordinary North Koreans can pick up anti-regime broadcasts.
 Both Koreas agreed to halt cross-border propaganda activities in 2002.



Not a Korean war, but no longer business as usual