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Uphill struggle

James Chui

Then-president Jiang Zemin was probably right when he said Hong Kong people were 'too simple, sometimes naive'. Yes, I was simple to have ever harboured a glimmer of hope in Donald Tsang Yam-kuen. Back in 2005, I wrote that Beijing's choice of Tsang was probably best for Hong Kong after the early resignation of Tung Chee-hwa, the first chief executive under Chinese rule.

But I wasn't so naive when I also suggested that Tsang should remember that opinion polls were favourable to Tung at the beginning, but public support quickly evaporated. Indeed, after five years in office, Tsang's popularity has also plummeted. A poll by the Chinese University of Hong Kong, following the passage of the constitutional reform package, found that Tsang had failed to attain the pass mark of 50 twice in succession, with those surveyed most recently giving him only 49.6 marks for his performance. A poll last month by the University of Hong Kong reported that his disapproval rating had exceeded 50 per cent twice in a row.

With two more years in office, Tsang is already being described as a lame duck. With the passage of the reform package, attention will increasingly focus on the race to be the next chief executive.

Tsang's unpopularity is entirely of his own making. Apart from his lack of a sense of history - in relating the Cultural Revolution to 'extreme democracy' - there is also his top-down approach reminiscent of the way Chinese emperors treated their subjects. Unlike Premier Wen Jiabao , who wants Chinese people to live with 'more happiness and more respect', Tsang has no respect for the people. He has sided with property developers and other special interests, but could have done much more for the underprivileged.

Beijing's immediate concern is that Hong Kong remains stable, so it cannot be a base for foreign subversion. The recent ice-breaking meetings between the central government's liaison office and pan-democrats - including office bearers of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China, a group that is banned on the mainland - shows the Communist Party's mastery of the art of united-front tactics: exploit contradictions to win over the majority and undermine the opposition.

Beijing's approval of the Democratic Party's 'one person, two votes' proposal for the five new district council functional constituency seats not only won over the Democratic Party, it has also split its opponents by precipitating an internecine war of words among the pan-democrats, with the Democratic Party now being attacked for betraying democracy.

The direct dialogue between Beijing's people and the Democrats is a good thing, but there is a downside. The way the liaison office intervened in a matter under the purview of the Hong Kong government crosses the boundary and sets a dangerous precedent. It tramples on Hong Kong's autonomy, and thereby international confidence in the city.

Tsang worked hard to persuade Beijing to accept the package. However, Beijing sees him as a remnant of the British colonialists and has never really trusted him. With or without Tsang, the central government would have given its approval of the revised package, because it understood in the nick of time that saying 'no' would have increased public support for the radical opposition, and Hong Kong might have become ungovernable.

Beijing's support for the package was also given with an eye on Taiwan. The central government views Taiwan's reunification as a national priority, but Taiwan's leaders have stood firm on their belief that 'Taiwan is not Hong Kong'. Until such time as Beijing secures control over Taiwan, the central government has to maintain the semblance that Hong Kong - with its 'one country, two systems' principle - is doing well.

But Beijing does not hold all the cards; Hong Kong and Taiwan can also change the mainland. With fewer restrictions on travel, mainland people are more exposed to freedoms than before. This exposure will affect China in the long run.

In Hong Kong, the built-in contradictions between the 'two systems' inevitably makes life difficult for its chief executive, who is caught between a rock and a hard place: while Hong Kong wants to forge ahead quickly with full democracy, Beijing is obsessed with stability and prefers gradual and orderly change. When Beijing is not democratic, it is almost naive to expect that it will allow real democracy in Hong Kong. Who in charge would cede power voluntarily?

Probably the biggest challenge for any chief executive is to balance the various points of view and interests within Hong Kong to achieve a consensus, and then to articulate and argue Hong Kong's case robustly to Beijing - all without offending the political master and thus committing political suicide.

The next chief executive would do well to listen to different voices, particularly those of civil society and youth. In the complex interactions within Greater China, he or she could broaden Hong Kong-Taiwan exchanges. Hong Kong may better serve both itself and the mainland by being different from the mainland.

Ultimately, the biggest challenge for the next chief executive is whether he or she can lead Hong Kong to achieve an even more prominent role within China, Asia and the world, or merely watch as it disappears into the black hole of the mainland to become just another Chinese coastal city.

James Chui served the United Nations for two decades before he taught international relations at the London School of Economics

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