Western Indologists might dismiss an Indian's condemnation of China's proposed sale of two nuclear reactors to Pakistan as crude nationalism. This would be delusive and, if anything, demonstrates the unconscious cultural hubris of outsiders who persist in insisting that Asians operate using foreign categories.
It is not geopolitics or nationalism that provokes criticism but the deal itself and the mechanics of its promulgation. Together, they make a mockery of the morality that must underlie even the most pragmatic of arrangements.
A recent article from Xinhua rationalises China's diplomacy by attributing international criticism to the 'double standards' of the 'nuclear tycoons of the West'. It claims that the US opened the nuclear 'Pandora's box' by concluding the 123 Agreement with India and that the agreement is identical to the Sino-Pakistan deal. But this glosses over the totally different aims and transparent processes that sanctify Indo-US negotiations.
The nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) forbids signatories to engage in nuclear commerce with countries that did not possess nuclear weapons on a cut-off date. India respected this. Even today, the US participates only in India's civil nuclear programme on the basis of a carefully worked-out plan dividing nuclear installations into military and civilian ones. New Delhi - barred from nuclear trade - also had to engage the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The US initiated a process of changing the rules and, ultimately, the NSG was unable to counter the US argument that India is reliable.
In contrast, Sino-Pakistani negotiations are secret. There is no sign of a separation plan, nor is there any indication of approaching the NSG for a waiver. Whereas Indians earned the right to nuclear commerce because they did the right thing, Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy has a well-documented and abysmal record of proliferation.
Furthermore, the absence of a Sino-Pakistani separation plan renders any new transfer unethical and illegal.