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SCMP Reporter

THE People's Liberation Army, which underpinned Deng Xiaoping's three comebacks from disgrace, could prove the patriarch's undoing, at least so far as his position in history is concerned. The former chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) should know that the army is a double-edged sword. The New Helmsman has since the June 4 massacre moved heaven and earth to ensure the PLA's ''loyalty'', apparently convinced that a smooth transition can thus be guaranteed.

  Politicising the PLA, however, is an invitation to infighting among the factions as well as army interference in daily life.

   The startling turn of events since the spring in China's most important institution has plunged military analysts in dismay. Mr Deng and President Jiang Zemin, his successor as CMC Chairman, have stood the theories of Sun Zi and practically all other military thinkers on their head.

  ''The people's sons and brothers'', as the PLA styles itself, are on the verge of becoming the private garrison of the Deng-Jiang clique.

  Since late 1993, Mr Jiang has presided over a series of ruthless purges whose goal is to ensconce Deng and Jiang proteges at the top.

  Take a look at Defence Minister Chi Haotian, who is slated to become a CMC Vice-Chairman by the end of this year.

  The former Chief of the General Staff has dominated the news so much that diplomats have started calling him China's Hau Pei-tsun, a reference to the Taiwan army strongman and head of the garrison at the presidential palace who was the island's prime minister from 1990-1993.

  Last week, General Chi heaped praise on a group of handicapped athletes and performers, who happen to work for Mr Deng's eldest son, Deng Pufang.

  The Defence Minister, who had a stint as head of the People's Daily in the Cultural Revolution, wrote a long newspaper article last Friday commemorating the Tangshan earthquake.

  Not surprisingly, the high point of the piece was that ''the working class of Tangshan resolutely embraced [the] Deng Xiaoping [line]''.

  In fire-spitting speeches marking the 67th anniversary of the founding of the PLA last Monday, General Chi saluted Mr Deng's ''ideas on army construction in the new era'' and pledged the army's fealty to ''the party Central Committee with Jiang Zemin as its core''.

  Apart from his febrile loyalty, however, General Chi would seem to have little to commend himself.

  A career commissar, the native of Zhaoyuan County, Shandong Province, never distinguished himself in combat, a criterion in previous promotions.

  Other Deng or Jiang favourites who are going places include the long-time Head of the Deng Xiaoping Office, Wang Ruilin, and another Hau Pei-tsun figure, the commander of the garrison of the Zhongnanhai party headquarters, Yang Dezhong.

   Oblivious of protocol, past personnel practices, and the protests of retired generals, Mr Jiang last May made Messrs Wang and Yang full generals.

  General Wang, who also hails from Zhaoyuan, is the front-runner to be CMC General Secretary, even though the post was abolished in 1992.

  The factionalisation of the top brass flies in the face of the military doctrines of both Mr Deng and Chairman Mao, one of the PLA's founders. GENERAL Wang has never been a professional soldier. According to internal publications, his military credentials consisted of little more than a few years in the 1940s as a secretary in a Zhaoyuan platoon, and later, as a telegraph transcriber in the confidential office of the Northeast Military District.

  The unexpected elevation of General Yang has betrayed a darker side of the succession slugfest. Mr Jiang is apparently so fearful of a coup that he has to buy the support of the chief palace guard.

  In fact, soon after becoming party General Secretary in late June 1989, Mr Jiang was distrustful of the military spook par excellence. For a year or so he tried to replace General Yang with Zeng Qinghong, his former aide in Shanghai who is Head of the Jiang Zemin Office.

  According to Western military attaches, Mr Deng's two daughters, Deng Nan and Deng Rong, have played bigger roles in helping the patriarch read PLA documents and make army-related decisions.

  Beijing is awash with rumours that Ms Deng Nan, a Vice-Minister of Science and Technology, is a candidate to take General Wang's job of Deputy Chief Political Commissar upon the latter's promotion to the CMC later this year.

   These blatant attempts at building a Deng or a Jiang army have raised eyebrows among other military and party factions.

  In their frequent private salons, retired generals from the other camps have openly groused about Deng-and Jiang-inspired ''nepotism''.

  They have also lambasted alleged attempts by members of the Deng household to make use of their connections to finance army corporations.

  In a stunning development, two heavyweight party elders who are Deng foes, Chen Yun and Peng Zhen, recently lent their names to the compilation of a history of the Fourth Field Army.

  Since his third comeback in 1978, Mr Deng has sidelined affiliates of the Fourth Field, once headed by former defence minister Lin Biao, and elevated officers from his own Second Field Army. It is a law of politics that factional intrigues invariably invite a counter-attack from members of rival cliques.

  Heads of anti-Deng and anti-Jiang camarillas, who reportedly include former state president Yang Shangkun, are busily looking for chinks in the armour of the ''mainstream faction''.

  Their task will not be difficult. Aside from empire-building, the Deng-Jiang clique has apparently broken other military disciplines, some of which have been laid down by themselves.

  To curry favour with the senior officers, Mr Jiang has dragged his feet in shutting down illegal or speculative military enterprises. He has also smoothed the way for army ''participation'' in foreign and economic policy.

  It was disclosed last week that most provinces and cities had been asked to ''guarantee the quantity and quality'' of military supplies, including foodstuffs and daily necessities.

  This runs counter to the CMC's decision last year that the army abide by market economics, and that PLA units make their procurements according to market prices.

  Feudalist manoeuvrings by the Deng-Jiang axis almost ensure that a ferocious struggle will break out among PLA factions - and that this will spill over to the civilian sectors.



Deng clasps PLA's double-edged sword