China’s ‘divide and rule’ attitude in Southeast Asia is good for no one, including itself

Michal Thim says Asean countries will be worse off dealing with China on a bilateral basis, while Beijing may not much like the emergence of a Southeast Asia aligned along US- or China-led groupings

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Published: 4:55pm, 8 Aug 2016Updated: 5:31pm, 8 Aug 2016

Dividing Asean might well create conditions where member states will no longer bother with the grouping and opt to align with like-minded countries instead. Illustration: Craig Stephens

The dispute in the South China Sea challenges China’s bilateral and multilateral relations in and outside its immediate neighbourhood. However, the first and most important casualty has been the coherence of Asean.

Granted, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is not known for sustaining unity in the face of pressure, and it is hardly a surprise to long-time observers that arguably the most significant organisation of regional integration has failed to reflect on the latest developments in the South China Sea. To wit: the July 24 joint communiqué adopted during the Asean foreign ministers’ meeting in Laos avoided the obvious elephant in the room: the ruling of The Hague tribunal that delivered a legal blow to Beijing’s South China Sea claims.

In this photo released on August 6, a pair of Chinese fighter jets take part in a patrol over the South China Sea. Photo: Xinhua via AP

PLA Air Force holds fresh patrols in South China Sea as it seeks to ‘normalise’ stepped-up surveillance

Prior to the ruling, Beijing had attempted to discredit the legitimacy of the court. It was more or less clear that the ruling would not be favourable. Thus, China made it equally clear that it would not be pleased to hear a word about the ruling. That The Hague decision is nothing short of a worst-case scenario further encourages Chinese efforts to double down on denying the obvious.

Since July 12, Beijing has had two opportunities to push back. Before this year’s Asean foreign ministers’ meeting, there was the annual Asia-Europe Meeting summit on July 15-16 in the Mongolian capital of Ulan Bator. Attempts were made to include references to the South China Sea and The Hague ruling but the request was flatly rejected. This was not surprising, considering that the meeting is typically more focused on matters of consensus. But while this is an informal forum for European and Asian countries, Asean has a more ambitious long-term outlook. Thus, its refusal to address the issue is of greater consequence. The fact that both the US and China dispatched their foreign ministers to this year’s Asean meeting testified to its importance.

Filipino and Vietnamese protesters call on China to respect the ruling by The Hague during a rally outside the Chinese consular office in Manila this month. Photo: AFP

In the South China Sea, Beijing is a big fish in a small pond

It speaks volumes about the divide within Asean and Beijing’s influence on some members, particularly Laos and Cambodia (two states which have virtually no stake in the dispute and strongly wish to avoid China’s wrath), that the foreign ministers’ issuing a joint statement of any kind was considered a positive outcome. In fact, at one point, ministers were close to issuing no statement, thus repeating the situation in July 2012 when Cambodia blocked a joint statement over the proposed inclusion of South China Sea developments. Four years later, the same result was avoided only because the Philippines decided to withdraw the proposal to mention the ruling, instead leaving the declaration with a vague note expressing the concerns of “some ministers” over island-building.

If Asean does not reflect upon major developments in the South China Sea affecting its membership, who else will?