President-elect Donald Trump’s intention to send Iowa Governor Terry Branstad to China as US ambassador is a good choice. Branstad is in for the challenge of a lifetime. It is not easy carrying the burden of “friend of China”.

Now, chosen by Trump as ambassador-designate, Branstad takes to his prospective post the assets and liabilities of being “an old friend” of China and its supreme leader, Xi. This is a big plus for America, but, it is also a heavy burden for the governor. What are the implications of such a status? How useful to American interests is this status of “friend”? Have other US officials or citizens had this status and what happened?

To start with, being a “friend of China” is a fraught status. There is often the implication that the friend will be solicitous of Chinese interests, understanding of Chinese problems, and willing to bargain to reach mutual accommodation. But above all, at this level, a “friend” is about national interests. A friend can provide Beijing’s leaders with an unvarnished and credible readout on the circumstance in the friend’s society. With so much uncertainty surrounding the emerging Trump presidency, for example, this will be a highly valued function for Chinese leaders – just explaining “what on earth is going on in Washington?”

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The second key function of a friend is providing an unobstructed channel of direct communication between the two leaderships, filtered through as little intervening bureaucracy as possible. If Branstad proves to have similar access to Trump as US ambassador Clark “Sandy” Randt had to president George W. Bush in the 2000s, he could well prove important to the relationship. China’s leaders will value him greatly. Being a friend affords you the credibility and access to play this role.

Nonetheless, there are dangers, one of which is that the Chinese think the friend has more influence back home than he does. In the case of the wartime journalist Edgar Snow, for instance, Mao Zedong ( 毛澤東 ) tried to use his “old friend” Snow to convey a message to the Nixon administration about his desire to improve relations. Unfortunately, president Richard Nixon overlooked the message because he saw Snow as not credible – Mao had greater faith in him than did Nixon.

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Another danger is that the friend can be criticised by Americans for not standing up sufficiently for US values and interests. After the June 4, 1989, mayhem in Tiananmen, for instance, “old friend” and national security advisor Brent Scowcroft was sent to Beijing to try to prevent a total rupture in relations, only to receive a torrent of criticism back home for undertaking the mission in the first place.