Global leadership remains beyond China’s grasp – for now
Yong Deng says its rise has given it a powerful voice on the international stage, but it may not yet be strong enough to offer a good alternative to the faltering liberal order
China must defend globalisation with deeds and not just words
The post-war liberal order has been in serious trouble since the 2008 financial crisis, which weakened Western economies and undermined global governance bodies and regulatory institutions. According to International Monetary Fund managing director Christine Lagarde, emerging economies accounted for over 80 per cent of global growth in the aftermath of the crisis, and now contribute 60 per cent of global gross domestic product.
Meanwhile, emerging powers, particularly China and Russia, have further undermined key liberal institutions and values. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and intervention in Syria have challenged principles of humanitarian interventionism, such as the responsibility to protect; and a rising China is confronting the West’s supremacy, in terms of hard and soft power, in the post-war global order.
The US has responded to these developments by trying to create a liberal order 2.0, and by pursuing a strategic pivot to salvage the status quo in Asia. Many observers have focused on America’s goal of preventing Chinese regional dominance. But the US also wants to defend and strengthen the principles that made post-war Asia’s success possible – what former US assistant secretary of state Kurt Campbell calls Asia’s “operating system”.
America’s interest in maintaining the liberal world order stems from its role as what political scientists call a “responsible fiduciary” and “privilege taker” in that system. But Trump sees US hegemony as a burden, and seems oblivious to the privileges that it affords, not least the many benefits associated with controlling the world’s main reserve currency. But, at the same time, Trump does not want to cede America’s global pre-eminence, which means that he could show a penchant for trade wars, or even military conflicts.
Foreign policy realists define great-power status in terms of a country’s self-perception or material capacities. For China, however, status is conceived in the context of its relationship with the established authority, namely the West. Starting in the 1990s, China began to see the US and the West as representing the global mainstream. While Chinese leaders might not aspire to join the West, they have certainly sought its recognition. They do not want China to be perceived as a hostile revisionist power, and cast into the “outgroup” of the existing order.
This is why China began to gravitate towards the West and seek further integration into the global economy. The government’s reformist ideology dictated that China “connect with the international track”. But, after the 2008 financial crisis, the Chinese suddenly discovered that the “international track” was in trouble. By necessity, but also by choice, China has since become a self-centered, “post-responsible” power. It is now less constrained by the status quo, and more intent on changing it.
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But China will face a unique set of problems as it tries to carry the torch of economic globalisation forward. For starters, it is still a developing country, and its domestic landscape is fraught with political perils and economic uncertainties. Xi’s government is struggling to maintain domestic stability as it moves China away from labour-intensive, investment-heavy economic growth towards a model based on domestic consumption and services. The primacy of this domestic agenda means that China’s attempt to lead global change will lack a clear vision and coherent strategy.
China may have the reins of globalisation, but it faces problems at home
A second problem stems from China’s incomplete transition on the world stage. After prevailing in the second world war, the US immediately and undeniably dominated the globe. China, in seeking to lead the next stage of economic globalisation, enjoys no such geopolitical power and legitimacy.
Observers in the West and the developing world question whether the solutions China is offering are genuine public goods; many suspect that China’s belt and road initiative, for example, is a self-serving, unilaterally imposed scheme. That uncertainty underscores a central point: while the liberal world order could be in trouble, a Chinese-led alternative is not yet discernible.
Yong Deng is professor of political science at the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland. His books on Chinese foreign relations include China’s Struggle for Status. Copyright: Project Syndicate