Iran and North Korea: why sanctions have worked to defuse one nuclear crisis but not the other
James Birkett says the US sanctions programme on Iran not only had support from a range of global actors, but Tehran was also more reliant on the global economy than North Korea is. A fresh approach is needed on the Korean stand-off
Iranians mock ‘ridiculous’ Trump speech, while Europeans stand by Tehran nuclear deal
Iran’s current position follows years of increasingly rigorous sanctions, which peaked in 2010 with the closure of huge areas of its economy to any form of investment. Key to this situation was the ability of the US – through a mixture of secondary sanctions and diplomatic efforts – to persuade the wider world to cooperate.
The US sanctions programme also benefited from Iran’s position as a modern economy, reliant for its key revenues on oil and gas exports as well as commercial relations with foreign partners tied to the US-dominated global financial system.
Why Trump’s threat to withdraw from Iran nuclear deal is a concern for China
A war of words: Kim vs Trump
Dear Trump, North Korea tortured me but please don’t attack it
The North Korean sanctions programme, first instituted in 1950, is notable for the extent of its coverage. It includes an embargo on the importation of a wide variety of goods – including luxury items, petroleum and related products, various metals, and anything else that could be used to benefit the operational capacity of the North Korean armed forces. Like the Iranian programme, it is supported by a series of measures passed by the UN Security Council and by the EU and other major Western economies. So, how to explain its failure to achieve its aim of bringing Pyongyang back to the negotiating table? Or even its more limited goal of preventing it from making progress in building nuclear weapons?
One answer may lie in the international politics of the programme. While the US could count on the backing of a wide range of global actors in support of its action against Iran, North Korea continues to enjoy close economic ties with China, its main political sponsor. Despite signs that Beijing is increasingly equivocal about the behaviour of the government in Pyongyang, US attempts to secure its intervention have made little progress. Meanwhile, considerable media coverage in recent years has noted the regular presence in Chinese universities of North Korean scientists – reading for degrees in subjects relevant to rocketry and nuclear science – in defiance of restrictions introduced by UN sanctions in 2016.
There is a further question regarding the utility of sanctions in forcing the terms of engagement with Kim’s government. The North Korean economy grew by 3.9 per cent over the past year and, given the strength of the regime’s grip on the country, and the regular reports of human rights abuses, it is difficult to see what level of economic hardship would be required to generate meaningful domestic opposition.
Faced with overwhelming odds on the battlefield, and a seemingly implacable foe, Pyongyang may simply be making the rational calculation that a successful nuclear programme is the only means of ensuring its survival. While Trump’s aggressive approach to opposition is now a widely understood – if not fully accepted – idiosyncrasy in the West, in North Korea, it carries with it the weight of the estimated 2.5 million deaths inflicted during the war of the 1950s, in which American bombing destroyed much of the country.
Crippled by sanctions, North Korea may not last a year, defector says
A defining reason for the success of the Iranian programme was the promise of better days ahead – now being realised in resumed oil and gas revenues, and the slow resumption of trading ties with the EU. Indeed, with Iran demonstrating its willingness to make good on its obligations regarding its nuclear programme, there is an increasing sense that it will retain its improved relationship with the European Union even if Trump scraps the US side of the programme.
UN-led multilateral talks offer the best hope for peace in Korea
With North Korea, a fresh approach might improve relations, involving the following two steps: firstly, an acceptance that sanctions are, in this instance, an ineffective and potentially counterproductive tool; and, secondly, the exploration of ways to engage effectively with a country on the brink of becoming a de facto nuclear power.
Before placing economic pressure on Pyongyang, the United States must demonstrate the benefit of engagement with the international community, and that it has more to offer than violence and intimidation.
James Birkett is an associate director at Alaco, a London-based business intelligence consultancy