Can India narrow its gap with China in defence, diplomacy and technology? Probably not under Modi
- India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi markets itself as an alternative and counterweight to China in Asia, but it ranks behind Beijing in soft and hard power and its reforms have been anaemic by comparison
Unsurprisingly, Indian leaders were absent from China’s Belt and Road Forum on April 26-27. This marked the second time they had boycotted the event, rooted in concerns that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project violates India’s territorial integrity.
However, Modi’s tenure has been plagued by inadequate investment to modernise India’s military. For New Delhi, it’s not just its defensive shortcomings that are of concern, but a host of other strategic areas where it lags well behind Beijing, from infrastructure to diplomacy and artificial intelligence.
A glaring divergence can be found in the domain of defence. Following an aerial tit-for-tat with Pakistan in February, after a terrorist attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir, Modi and the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party have sought to squeeze as much political capital as possible out of the incident by using national security as a significant platform in their re-election campaign.
It has not been very successful in drumming up interest in its “made-in-India” artillery exports, either.
Driven by a desire for naval dominance of the Indo-Pacific, Beijing has looked to enhance its deep-sea capabilities through “intelligent” military systems.
While India has taken note of China’s investment in AI and other dual-use technologies, it has yet to counter with any effective AI-led strategy of its own.
Meanwhile, 42 per cent of India’s defence budget is sapped by salaries and pensions. Devoid of reforms, asymmetric inequalities have only widened and the gap is set to grow.
This leads to the next concern: an undersized diplomatic corps. Despite a population of 1.3 billion, India retains a paltry 940 diplomats, barely more than Singapore, in comparison to China’s 7,500.
After coming to power in 2014, one of Modi’s fundamental shifts was to seek greater alignment with countries looking to New Delhi to be a reliable counterweight to Beijing.
While India and China have the potential for benign competition, given their growing clout regionally and globally, several years of tense developments in bilateral relations reached a peak in 2017 during the 73-day border stand-off between the two at Doklam.
India understands that any potential reset would be tactical: policymakers have to grapple with obstacles that are swiftly defining the nature of the Sino-Indian relationship, taking power asymmetries, unresolved border disputes and the China-Pakistan partnership into account.
China’s infrastructural investments – in India’s own backyard – are shifting the long-term strategic picture. In response, India’s competing investments have been deemed lacklustre. India also opted out of a Quad-led project to offer alternatives to the belt and road scheme.
Whether the BJP returns to power or not, India’s next government will be saddled with a bureaucracy that hinders military reforms, a diminished diplomatic contingent and an ineffective counter to Beijing’s geostrategic projects.
Clearly, if India fails to catch up in these strategic areas, it risks widening the gap so far in the short term that it would render any long-term Asian hegemonic strategy moot.
Amar Diwakar is a freelance writer and researcher of international affairs and political economy, focused on the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Belt and Road Initiative. He holds an MSc in international politics from SOAS, University of London