Under Donald Trump, America may go from trade rule-maker to rule-taker
Matthew P. Goodman says that as the Trump administration escalates the trade conflict and undermines prior agreements, one consequence will be that it is no longer active in writing the trade guidelines that have been beneficial to American interests
Trump’s harsh trade actions and statements have also rocked the global system of institutions and rules that the US created and championed for 70 years. This may not be the president’s intent, but it is an approach that will have real costs for US economic and strategic interests. The use of Section 232 of a cold war-era trade law for the transparently commercial objective of limiting competition from imported steel and automobiles violates the spirit, if not the letter, of World Trade Organisation rules and gives licence to other countries like China to cite “national security” as an excuse for protectionism against US exporters and investors.
Among other things, Tokyo agreed to provide special protection to over 200 EU “geographical indications”, regional food and beverage brands like Gorgonzola and champagne that Brussels claims deserve special protection. If this becomes the global standard, Illinois-based Kraft Heinz will no longer be able to sell its ubiquitous green containers of “Parmesan” under that name.
Even more potentially damaging to US interests are the provisions in the EU-Japan agreement on digital trade. Because of political sensitivities about personal privacy in Europe, Brussels resisted Tokyo’s pressure for a binding agreement on free flows of data. Instead, the two sides agreed to recognise the “adequacy” of each other’s privacy regime, enabling transfers of personal information but not enshrining the principle of free data flows as an enforceable commitment. This sent a bad signal to the many countries around the world that want to require data to be stored in local servers and to restrict cross-border flows.
The US embassy in Hanoi was sufficiently concerned that it issued a public statement warning that the new policy could violate Vietnam’s international trade commitments – a protest that would carry more weight if the US were still a member of TPP and not undermining the WTO.
All of this is music to Beijing’s ears. As my colleague at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Samm Sacks, recently wrote, China is on a “mission to write the rules for global cyber governance”. Beijing’s preferred approach includes not only localisation requirements and restrictions on outbound data transfers, but also pushing out Chinese technical standards and Beijing’s vision of “cyberspace sovereignty”. As Sacks says, this “crashes headlong in the foundational principles of the internet in market-based democracies: online freedom, privacy, free international markets, and broad international cooperation”.
No doubt a legal mechanism to manage inevitable commercial disputes in belt and road projects is necessary, but the fact that Beijing opted to set up its own courts rather than rely on existing international arbitration centres in Hong Kong, London and New York shows that there is a powerful new rule-maker on the global stage.
Some in the Trump administration appear to have woken up to the dangers of letting others write the global economic rules. On July 30, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other senior administration officials laid out an economic and commercial vision for the Indo-Pacific region. A credible trade and investment strategy will help replace the destructive tariff-based approach with one that puts the US back in its traditional role as global rule-maker and norm-setter.
Matthew P. Goodman holds the William E. Simon Chair in political economy at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Distributed by Pacific Forum CSIS. Copyright: Pacific News Service