US-China rivalry – over the South China Sea especially – may be a continuous contest rather than war
- While China consolidates its position in Asia, its neighbours and the US are adjusting accordingly. War serves neither side’s interests, especially if they can find ‘focal points’ for negotiation
Speaking at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong used an oft-spoken aphorism: “When elephants fight, the grass is trampled; when elephants make love, the grass also suffers.” Over the weekend, I counted at least three other instances in which the statement was used. It shows one thing: Sino-American competition has intensified, and has indeed become a dialogue of the deaf.
In his corner, Wei gave as good as he got, stressing the peaceful nature of China’s rise and contribution to international security. While the general sounded tentative initially, he grew increasingly confident during his solo plenary, and at times asked Dr John Chipman, director general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), if he could answer more questions.
To raised eyebrows, the general said China has never invaded other countries, and that its militarisation of the disputed South China Sea was purely defensive. Speaking in Mandarin, he fired a broadside at the US: “A talk? Welcome. A fight? Ready. Bully us? No way.”
Sino-American competition and the risk of conflict will not go away any time soon. As Lee noted in his speech, there are deep wells in China and America’s domestic politics fuelling the tensions.
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In America, neither Republicans nor Democrats want to risk being seen as soft on China. In China, no leader wants to be seen succumbing to Western pressure, given China’s long history with the West.
One, however, should not be quick to draw the conclusion that the two titans are destined for war. The South China Sea might be apposite here.
A chapter in the recently released IISS Asia-Pacific Regional Assessment takes aim at three areas of conventional wisdom about the maritime area: “China wins”; “a calmer South China Sea”; and “China and the US headed to war”.
In short, as China consolidates its position in the South China Sea, the US and like-minded allies are moving to counter its advances there. Writ large, the same situation applies to the Asia-Pacific: a continuous contestation in a new cold war.
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How then could open conflict be avoided? Thomas Schelling, the Nobel Prize-winning economist, was known for his insights into bargaining and strategic behaviour. In his classic The Strategy of Conflict, he raised the concept of “focal points” – an unambiguous solution that stands out as the natural answer when participants do not have a chance to coordinate their responses.
His students were asked where and when two people could meet in New York City if they could not communicate in advance. The common solution was to meet under the clock in Grand Central Terminal at noon.
In his keynote speech, Lee raised one obvious focal point in Sino-US relations: that China’s growth must be accommodated, and that other countries and China have to adjust. This is worth pursuing. Lee said that if both sides look at the trade and technology issues on their own merits, this could form a basis of trust.
In the South China Sea, the US can avoid staking its credibility on ensuring that a non-coercive process is followed in every instance. Michael Swaine, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has suggested that, in return, China could declare areas outside territorial waters and exclusive economic zones as open seas. On Taiwan, there could be an agreed-on limitation on US arms sales, in exchange for verifiable limits on China’s deployments towards Taiwan.
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Speaking at the dialogue, Delfin Lorenaza, the defence secretary of the Philippines, quoted Barbara Tuchman, the American historian. In The Guns of August, a magisterial work on the outbreak of World War I, Tuchman observed how great power conflict took place “in the midst of crisis where nothing is as clear or as certain as it appears in hindsight”.
A more apt work by Tuchman is The March of Folly, which chronicles “wooden-headedness” – the common phenomenon throughout history when the policies of governments ran contrary to their national interests. The leaders of Troy dragged the “suspicious looking wooden horse” inside their walls; Napoleon and Hitler invaded Russia despite the failures suffered by their predecessors; King George III opted to coerce rather than conciliate with the new American colonies.
Given what is at stake in Sino-American ties, it is the earnest hope of many countries that Washington and Beijing can shed the wooden-headedness and march away from folly, not towards it.
William Choong is a Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security at the IISS