Will the latest G20 meeting in Japan turn out to be just another Groundhog Day with the same old platitudes by the same old elites? To prevent this, leaders must consider three factors during their meetings. First, the potential for, and occurrence of, deglobalisation, and its echoes in history. There have been several earlier “waves” of globalisation, including a succession of empires, the opening up of sea routes and the famed Silk Road. While Immanuel Wallerstein’s “world systems theory” argues that a capitalist world economy has been in existence since the 16th century, for many others, “globalisation 1.0” was the period supercharged by the Industrial Revolution and mass production from the 18th century onwards, which ended in the run-up to World War I and its aftermath. Second, it is too easily forgotten, or at best dismissed, by politicians and policymakers that globalisation is neither inexorable nor irreversible. Rather, there are many difficulties in maintaining a globalised and open world economy. Moreover, there is no one form of capitalism with implications for globalisation, but rather, even within Asia, many varieties. These range, in Yuji Harada and Hironori Tohyama’s terms, from “innovation-led” (Japan, Korea), “trade-led” (Malaysia, Thailand) and “city” (Singapore) to “insular semi-agrarian” (Indonesia, Philippines) and “continental-mixed” (China) capitalism. Globalisation operates within this very varied economic – and political – terrain. Clearly, Francis Fukuyama was incorrect in prophesying “ the end of history ” and global dominance of Western liberal democracy. Interestingly, the ebbing of support for globalisation is due to four factors similar to those that ended the last high tide in 1914. These are “great power” conflict, economic depression, nationalism and protectionism. Today’s conflict is no longer between Britain and Germany but the US and China. The Great Depression that began in 1929 is echoed in the problems, following the 2008 global financial crisis, of world economic fragility and weakness. For example, cross-border flows of capital as a percentage of global gross domestic product (GDP) declined dramatically after the crisis and remain below their peak in the early 2000s. Trade growth has not returned to its pre-crisis levels. Indeed, growth in global trade has fallen sharply and openness in finance and trade has stalled. Furthermore, there has been relatively little trade liberalisation recently but, rather, a shift to greater protectionism. Pre-1914 nationalism is mirrored in the recent rise of populism and the electoral success of populist parties, even within European Union nations Italy , Poland and Hungary . US-China trade war reflection of shifting centre for global trade, author says This development may well temper the EU’s federalist instincts and drive “ever-closer” political union by stealth under the guise of “needed” small steps towards economic integration, according to a strategy by one of the EU’s founders, Jean Monnet. In terms of the rise of protectionism, US President Donald Trump’s trade wars were met in 2017 by what seemed to be a more globalist and free-trade supporting China, reflected in the speeches of Chinese President Xi Jinping, for example, on the Belt and Road Initiative and at the Davos meeting , where he said globalisation was not to blame for the world’s economic woes and that efforts to try to prevent globalisation would not succeed. Xi reiterated these views at the 2018 Boao Forum for Asia , pledging to lift restrictions on foreign equity investments in Chinese financial firms and raise the investment cap for foreign carmakers. The much-delayed London-Shanghai stock connect scheme, launched this month, was in line with this. Watch: The 2018 Boao Forum for Asia Nevertheless, there has been a volte-face by China and a backtracking on reforms, such as encouraging unproductive state-owned enterprises to grow even bigger, reducing competition, going back to the old formula of supporting unnecessary construction projects and loosening credit while tightening control over the hi-tech sector. Third, the world’s economic centre of gravity has shifted; there is an inexorable pivot to Asia with its new economic powerhouses. The longer term impacts of this for Pax Americana are obvious, just as the US’ economic rise was for Pax Britannia. R.I.P. Pax Americana under Trump, a tweeting force of destruction While the US defence budget was over US$600 billion in 2018 and China’s was under US$200 billion, America’s share of the world economy has continued to shrink, by almost a half, from 40 per cent in 1960 to about 24 per cent in 2017. So too, has the EU’s, with its slower growth rates. For example, between 1980 and 2015, the EU’s share of global GDP fell from around one-third (34 per cent) to less than a quarter (24 per cent). The EU’s decline will be hastened by the loss of its second-largest component, the UK economy, which contributed over 15 per cent of the EU’s total GDP in 2017. Over the same period, the Asia-Pacific region’s share of the world economy rose from around 20 per cent to supplant the EU’s former position as it approaches one-third (31 per cent) of global GDP. By 2050, Asia could account for 38 per cent of global GDP and 51 per cent of the global population. So, globalisation is facing strong and turbulent head winds, stemming from the turn away from it by its main proponent and standard bearer – the US – at least politically, along with China’s more ambivalent position. However, one of globalisation’s former driving forces – the UK – has seemingly changed tack, making a post-Brexit clarion call to be less inward-EU-looking and return to a more “global Britain”. Professor Chris Rowley is a visiting fellow at Kellogg College, University of Oxford, and Professor Emeritus at Cass Business School, City, University of London