If Beijing is considering deploying the PLA in Hong Kong, it should heed the legacy of the Hungarian Revolution and act with care

In 1956, the Soviet Union forcefully quelled dissent in Hungary, and consequently lost moral standing in the cold war
China should remember this and consider what PLA intervention in Hong Kong would mean for its ‘peaceful rise’ narrative

Nicholas Ross Smith

Published: 6:00am, 8 Aug 2019

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The ongoing protests in Hong Kong over the extradition bill are undoubtedly the biggest crisis since the introduction of the “one country, two systems” legal framework to manage China-Hong Kong relations after the handover in 1997.

In the three months the protests have been going on, one thing is crystal clear: there is a significant group of organised Hongkongers who are prepared to protest loudly – and even fight – to protect their rights. Less clear is what Beijing will do about the protests. The brewing trouble is problematic for a number of reasons.

First, the sight of Hongkongers taking to the streets has the potential to inspire mainlanders. Hong Kong (along with Taiwan) is seen as a potential back door for subversive ideas to infiltrate China. This is especially worrying for Beijing as there has been a significant erosion of freedoms on the mainland in recent years which could foment internal discontent.

Second, to date, Beijing has blamed the protests on Western instigators. It has told Chinese citizens that the West is out to undermine China in an attempt to spark regime change. However, at the same time, Beijing tells its citizens that it has the power to resist the West, so non-action in the face of the protests could cause significant internal dissonance.

Third, despite fears at the time of the handover, Hong Kong has remained a world-class financial centre and emerged as an important gateway to China. However, the turmoil in Hong Kong is potentially disruptive for its international financial reputation, especially as it has a close (and more stable) competitor in Singapore.

In the eyes of Beijing’s strategists, one objective is likely to be paramount: quell the protests as soon as possible and try to return Hong Kong to a semblance of “normality”.

The fear is that the “as soon as possible” solution might involve the use of force – specifically, the use of troops and military hardware from the People’s Liberation Army.

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Chinese officials have insinuated that PLA intervention is a potential scenario and the PLA itself has posted “threatening” content on its social media accounts.

A screen grab from a video released by the People’s Liberation Army demonstrates their ability to quell violent protests. Photo: Handout

Sending in the PLA would probably achieve the objective of quelling the protests – although it could also easily inflame things further. Beyond the potential for pushing the protesters towards rebellion, this action would create a larger, more insidious long-term problem for Beijing: an international backlash.

It is important to realise that such a backlash would not be military. No Western country is going to engage China militarily in defence of Hong Kong (Taiwan should be wary of US “commitments” too). But there would be a critical reputational backlash that could significantly hinder China’s long-term ambitions.

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One historical analogy worth engaging here is the Soviet Union’s decision to send the Red Army to quell the Hungarian revolution in 1956. Hungary was locked in something akin to a “one country, two systems” arrangement with the Soviet Union after World War II – it was nominally “independent” but was in practice a puppet state.

Hungarians were continually frustrated by the perceived Soviet influence in their politics and this gradually snowballed into a full-blown revolution by late 1956. Moscow, worried about the subversive and diffusive effects of a revolution within its gravitation field of satellite states, decided military action was necessary to quell the revolution and restore order.

Honour guards hoist the Hungarian flag during an official commemoration of the 59th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution in front of the Parliament building in Budapest in October 2015. Photo: EPA

Given the difference in capabilities between Hungary and the Soviet Union – and Hong Kong’s disparity with China is even greater – the revolution was easily quelled by the Red Army. And ostensibly, the intervention was successful because the man chosen to replace revolutionary leader Imre Nagy – Janos Kadar – oversaw an ostensibly pro-Soviet regime in Hungary for the next 32 years.

However, the international fallout was significant for the Soviet Union. Before the intervention, it was winning the hearts and minds of many – especially since Nikita Khrushchev had replaced Joseph Stalin in 1953 – and was presenting itself as a significant ideological challenger to the West.

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But, after the heavy-handed tactics in Hungary – as many as 3,000 people were killed in the intervention – the Soviet Union’s international reputation took a massive hit, especially among left-leaning groups in the West. This gave the United States and its allies significant moral high ground, which proved useful in the information war that was a key component of the larger cold war.

Furthermore, the intervention in Hungary did not prevent unrest from emerging in other areas of the Soviet Union’s gravitational field. The most famous example after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution was the 1968 Prague Spring which, again, was quelled by a Red Army intervention.

For China, given that it has painstakingly attempted to characterise its current rise to international prominence as being “peaceful” and “friendly”, suffering a similar reputational hit as did the Soviet Union after its Hungary intervention would be a significant hindrance to its long-term goals.

At this stage, it is likely that China is just sabre-rattling. But the longer the demonstrations continue – and especially if the protesters become emboldened like the Hungarians did in 1956 – the more Beijing will become tempted to use force. However, short-term impulses must be avoided, as the international fallout would probably hurt China in the long run far more than this group of Hong Kong protesters ever could.

Nicholas Ross Smith is Assistant Professor of International Studies at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China

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