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Chinese President Xi Jinping with African leaders during a group photo session at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing in September 2018. Photo: AP
Opinion
Zhou Bo
Zhou Bo

Africa is a test lab for how China approaches international security and peacekeeping: non-interference but not indifference

  • China’s policy requires that it not interfere in its partners’ internal affairs or strategies for development
  • However, Beijing generously funds security in Africa to meet international commitments on protecting civilians

The 1st China-Africa Peace and Security Forum in Beijing in July was impressive. Out of the 54 African countries – including eSwatini, which has no diplomatic relations with China – 50 nations and the African Union sent high-powered delegations, including 15 defence ministers and chiefs of defence forces, to attend the week-long forum.

China’s ubiquitous economic activities in Africa are well known. But fewer people know that China’s military has been involved in the continent for decades. From the late 1950s to the 1970s, the People’s Liberation Army trained thousands of African “freedom fighters” who played a decisive role in fighting against colonialist rulers for national independence. Among them are seven African presidents, including president Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo, president Sam Nujoma of Namibia and President Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea.

A global China today has to answer this question: how to protect China’s ever-growing overseas interests and shoulder the international obligations incumbent upon a major power? These interests are particularly vulnerable in the Middle East and Africa, and there are good and bad lessons to learn.

In 2011, Beijing was caught totally unprepared, having to withdraw 35,860 Chinese nationals from Libya when violence spread. All investments and properties were abandoned. But the PLA Navy’s counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden since the end of 2008 is a success story. So far the Chinese flotillas have escorted over 6,600 Chinese and foreign ships.

Africa is a lab to test China’s outlook for global security governance. Beijing’s “five-no” policies towards Africa – that is, no interference in ways of development; no interference in domestic affairs; no forcing China’s will upon Africa countries; no help with political conditions attached, and; no pursuit of selfish political interests in investments and financing towards Africa – could be applied virtually anywhere else in the world.

The West may grumble that such policies have no “principles” regarding human rights and democracy, but they could at least prove that China really has no intention of selling her ideology abroad.

All types of overseas PLA involvement, be it peacekeeping, counter-piracy, non-combatant evacuation or disaster relief, could be found in Africa. In dealing almost exclusively with such non-traditional threats, the PLA has given a clue to its modus operandi overseas – helping, rather than policing, the world.

Both China and the US have bases in Djibouti. But China’s is only a logistic supply station for counter-piracy and peacekeeping while America’s Camp Lemonnier is, according to The Economist, “the most important base for drone operations outside the war zone of Afghanistan”, with drones conducting missions in Yemen and Somalia.

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The biggest challenge for United Nations peacekeeping in Africa is how to balance, if not reconcile, the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state and the responsibilities to protect civilians. Non-interference is enshrined in the UN Charter, while protection of civilians is now at the heart of UN peacekeeping.

For those vowing to “never again” see another Rwandan genocide, their outcry could not be louder: what is the use of peacekeeping if civilians cannot be protected? But what if a host-state government changes its consent when its interests conflict with peacekeeping activities, such as supporting the implementation of a peace agreement on which the government wishes to renege?

Members of the PLA Navy stand guard as the 12th Chinese naval escort flotilla sets sail from a port in Zhoushan in July 2012 for a mission in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters to protect commercial ships from pirate attacks. Photo: Xinhua

And, in extreme cases, what if the perpetrator against civilians happens to be the government itself? The UN has no answers ready for these questions. The African Union purports to have the right to intervene in its member states in “grave circumstances”; namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, but this is not easy to decide upon or implement, given the practical, legal and procedural problems.

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Such a situation could be particularly challenging for the Chinese government, which takes non-interference as the core of its foreign policies but also wishes for its position to be interpreted as “non-indifference”.

Beijing didn’t sign the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians, but China’s support of the protection of civilians as a permanent member of UN Security Council is reflected in council resolutions, which have gradually made the protection of civilians the top priority of peacekeeping since 1999.

Besides, of the 8,000 standby peacekeeping troops China has established, 850 are already registered with the UN’s Vanguard Brigade. They have to be deployed within 60 days to new troublespots, primarily for the purpose of protecting civilians.

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China has neither colonies nor a sphere of influence in Africa; therefore, it can actually provide more help with clean hands and without being misinterpreted. But the best way to enhance security in Africa is to support Africans in resolving African issues via African means.

This is shown in how, since 2010, China has been stepping up military help to the African Union to support the collective security mechanism in Africa. Cooperation is evident in training, intelligence sharing and joint exercises. In 2015, President Xi Jinping announced at the UN Headquarters that Beijing would provide US$100 million to the African Union to support African standby forces and quick response forces.

The forum’s name, the 1st China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, indicates it is only the first of many such meetings. This is a new start, a chance for Chinese and Africans to join hands again to change the continent’s security landscape for the better.

Zhou Bo is an honorary fellow with the PLA Academy of Military Science in China

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