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Illustration: Craig Stephens
Opinion
Josef Gregory Mahoney
Josef Gregory Mahoney

Tiananmen’s lesson: if Hong Kong’s protesters want a fight, Beijing will certainly give it to them

  • The leaders of China’s Communist Party have learned from both Tiananmen and the fall of the Soviet Union not to give in
  • The mainland Chinese public also appears to have little sympathy for Hongkongers, which will free Beijing’s hand to act decisively

Vladimir Lenin once quipped that it was better to fall fighting in the streets than in some minister’s antechamber. Such a fate, he acknowledged, was even too cruel for a liberal. Elsewhere, he extolled the virtues of “learning” in the streets, with many failed attempts at revolution likely before success.

Lenin’s success can be questioned, but without a doubt Marxism-Leninism found successors in China, as Comrade Xi Jinping repeatedly reminds us. Suffice to say that China’s Communist Party still knows a thing or two about waging revolution, and suppressing it.

Seeing the bravado of Hong Kong protesters willing to shed blood for the cause, as international headlines trumpet, certainly elicits sympathy; but be forewarned. Most efforts are utterly catastrophic, both for the cause and those who advance it. Success requires the right moment, the right conditions and a host of other factors that are irreducible to 800 words.

Some believe Beijing has misread the situation in Hong Kong and chose a firm response when a softer one might have worked. Others believe suppression has always been the goal, and this moment represents the last chance for resistance. Let us hope that protesters have not also misread China.

Whatever Beijing’s intentions, two things are certain: it will neither cave in to demands nor allow the situation to escalate further.

The apparent rejection of the protesters’ five demands is surely fuel to the fire, but the situation has reached a tipping point and now, as a matter of principle, Beijing will not negotiate. Despite the fury and willingness to fight, hopefully some will take a moment to consider the following four key points, if they haven’t already done so.

First, while it is impossible to gauge, on the whole, public opinion in China appears to be against the protesters. While many in China might not be well informed about what’s actually happening, they are not completely misinformed either.

Furthermore, in such matters, most Chinese easily become nationalistic, especially now given the current international climate, which has left many Chinese feeling victimised by outside forces.

Additionally, while many Chinese have had mixed feelings about Hongkongers in recent years, from egg rolls to eye-rolls and empathy, the latter has largely evaporated. None of this might matter to protesters, but it should.

It means Beijing will have a relatively free hand to do whatever it deems necessary, and it will actually increase public pressure on Beijing to act.

Second, when Chinese leaders and troops do move, they will act with the sort of decisiveness and physical engagement not yet experienced by those in the streets. How many charges for the light brigade? Hong Kong will know martial law and it is difficult to imagine what comes next.

Protesters may fear becoming another city like Shanghai or Shenzhen, but there are worse fates. It’s not inconceivable that Hong Kong will lose its special status and find itself under conditions like those in Tibet or Xinjiang, and there would be little anyone could or would do to stop it.

Third, since 1989, and especially since the Soviet collapse, a reputed litmus test for senior party leadership is a willingness to spill blood when either party leadership or national integrity are threatened. This stems from the lessons Beijing drew from both events: namely, that their actions in Tiananmen were on the right side of history and that the Soviet leadership lacked similar resolve, with devastating political and national consequences.

In fact, we might be concerned that this has produced a sort of political calculus that explains the extraordinary responses to Falun Gong almost two decades ago and what’s unfolded in Xinjiang more recently. If so, this might be even more true under President Xi Jinping, whose consolidation of power and status as commander-in-chief will push him to resist because he will have to own it completely; but if he moves, then he will have to go all in.

Fourth, by many accounts democracy and the rule of law fare poorly these days in the Western world as well. There have been many popular protests in the US and Britain over the past decade alone, including those in Britain now with protests against a prorogued parliament. What have they accomplished? What did the “umbrella movement” accomplish? What have the current protests accomplished?

Lenin was right of course, but up to a point. It is possible now to imagine tanks in Hong Kong, and tanks might return to Belfast and even enter Edinburgh at some point.

Beijing knows these are hard times that require robust organisation, strategic leadership, sober tactics and disciplined execution – lessons as old as Sun Tzu, reinterpreted by Mao Zedong and still at the core of party thought, whether the cause is just or not.

The effective revolutionary never composes her own requiem. If necessary, she slinks away, out the back door as Mao himself sometimes did, and finds a better moment to enter the fray.

Josef Gregory Mahoney is professor of politics and director of the International Graduate Programme at East China Normal University in Shanghai

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