But historical patterns are not the only reason for the party to be worried. The conditions that enabled the regime to recover from the self-inflicted disasters of Maoism and to prosper over the last four decades have largely been replaced by a less favourable – and in some senses, more hostile – environment.

The greatest threat to the party’s long-term survival lies in the unfolding cold war with the US. During most of the post-Mao era, China’s leaders kept a low profile on the international stage, painstakingly avoiding conflict while building strength at home. But by 2010, China had become an economic powerhouse, pursuing an increasingly muscular foreign policy. This drew the ire of the US, which began gradually to shift from a policy of engagement towards today’s confrontational approach.

With its superior military capabilities, technology, economic efficiency, and alliance networks (which remain robust, despite President Donald Trump’s destructive leadership), the US is far more likely to prevail in the Sino-American cold war than China. Though an American victory could be pyrrhic, it would more than likely seal the party’s fate.

The party also faces strong economic headwinds. The so-called Chinese miracle was fuelled by a large and youthful labour force, rapid urbanisation, large-scale infrastructure investment, market liberalisation, and globalisation – all factors that have either diminished or disappeared.

Radical reforms – in particular, the privatisation of inefficient state-owned enterprises and the end of neo-mercantilist trading practices – could sustain growth. But, despite paying lip service to further market reforms, the party has been reluctant to implement them, instead clinging to policies that favour state firms at the expense of private entrepreneurs. Because the state-owned sector forms the economic foundation of one-party rule, the prospect that party leaders will suddenly embrace radical economic reform is dim.

Domestic political trends are similarly worrying. Under Xi, the party has abandoned the pragmatism, ideological flexibility, and collective leadership that served it so well in the past. With the party’s neo-Maoist turn – including strict ideological conformity, rigid organisational discipline, and fear-based strongman rule – the risks of catastrophic policy mistakes are rising.

To be sure, the party will not go down without a fight. As its grip on power weakens, it will probably attempt to stoke nationalism among its supporters, while intensifying repression of its opponents.

But this strategy cannot save China’s one-party regime. While nationalism may boost support for the party in the short term, its energy will eventually dissipate, especially if the party fails to deliver continued improvement in living standards. And a regime that is dependent on coercion and violence will pay dearly in the form of depressed economic activity, rising popular resistance, escalating security costs, and international isolation.