This was evident in two massive non-violent protests, the Article 23 demonstrations, where the draconian bill was ultimately withdrawn, and in the proposal over national education that was ultimately
withdrawn. Such a local climbdown was also evident when Hongkongers fought off the proposed extradition bill: Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor’s self-admitted misjudgment produced a bill that is ultimately to be
withdrawn.
If Beijing is seen to override Hong Kong’s autonomy to dictate outcomes, protests are more likely to be sustained and violent. This is not surprising, as the question of Beijing’s interference and the resultant diminution of Hong Kong’s
autonomy has been at the heart of nearly all mass protests.
Accordingly, for the current protests, a critical reflection on the enduring official failure to guard Hong Kong’s autonomy should be the main focus of any effort to resolve the crisis and lay a better foundation going forward. An immediate step is for Beijing to step back and for the Hong Kong government to react appropriately and with moderation to the public concerns articulated by the masses.
I must be clear: this is not a vote of confidence in Hong Kong’s government, but an acknowledgement that it ignores public opinion at its
own peril. Beijing faces no such constraint. History tells us it is better for Hong Kong to fully own the problem and have the power to solve it.
Beijing’s penchant for control and its anxiety over political opposition
poorly equips it to understand the needs of an open society, where popular debate is expected to resolve public concerns.
If Beijing is calling the shots, and proceeds to take a
hard line on the matter, then civil disobedience and confrontation are typically the preferred methods of protest. In such an event, protesters are likely to be ridiculed and ignored. Moreover, greater interference and repression, with the local government acting as Beijing’s agent, are likely to follow.
The deeper problem underlying the protests is the Hong Kong government’s inability to defend autonomy, for which the cure is the
promised democratic reform that the government has so far proven unwilling to support.
The issue of autonomy not only drives the protests but also determines whether they succeed or fail. The difficulty driving the crisis is that the space for local autonomy has shrunk considerably. This is inversely correlated to increasing Beijing interference, and, if it persists, predicts a rough future for Hong Kong.
As Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor
hinted in a frank meeting with business leaders, Beijing is clearly
calling the shots on the official response to the protests. Unfortunately, when Beijing officials face such a challenge, they instinctively double down on the authoritarian tactics that serve them on the mainland, but rarely produce the same result in an open society.
Hong Kong’s local officials should be helping them to understand this difficulty, that Beijing does not always know best when it comes to Hong Kong.
An area where Beijing has total control is the question of democratic reform, as dictated in the National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s
2004 decision imposing a five-step approval process. This meant that the 2004 protests over democracy and the 2014 “umbrella movement” were doomed from the start. Is there a similar fate awaiting the current protests?
The problem of weak autonomy, bolstered by local officials’
desire to please Beijing, is the thread running through every protest in Hong Kong. Mainland interference is again and again mirrored by local efforts to garner Beijing’s approval – such as the
extradition bill.
This has encouraged the escalation of protest strategies from the non-violent marches that successfully addressed local matters in the past, to the confrontations that characterise the current protests. China has fuelled the fire by
praising the violent approach of the Hong Kong police, who have effectively become a branch of the mainland security apparatus.
Hong Kong officials and their supporters should offer an honest and comprehensive account to Beijing of Hong Kong’s popular concerns, and Beijing officials should step back and encourage the Hong Kong government to handle the matter in a manner appropriate to an open society, in accordance with Basic Law promises.
This should at a minimum include the widely favoured independent investigation, even
supported by the pro-establishment camp.
Still, whatever the trigger, protesters ultimately arrive at democratic reform as the fundamental cure. This aims to create a Hong Kong government that can better speak up for autonomy and avoid the cycle of protests and repression.
While Beijing has been reluctant to accept the universal suffrage it
once promised, it is important to emphasise that a democratically elected government need not be one that is constantly at odds with Beijing, as mainland officials may fear, but one that could find its voice to explain Hong Kong’s concerns when necessary.
The current crop of Beijing-appointed local officials have
failed in their duty to convey Hong Kong’s concerns in terms digestible to Beijing. Instead, they choose again and again to kowtow to Beijing and put Hong Kong autonomy at risk.
Professor Michael C. Davis, a former professor of law at the University of Hong Kong, is now a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre in Washington, DC and a senior research scholar at the Weatherhead East Asia Institute at Columbia University
