As could be seen at the “Taiwan with Hong Kong” rally in August, Taiwan’s young and politically active voters are increasingly sympathetic to their Hong Kong counterparts; the same concerns gave rise to the
2014 sunflower movement against economic integration with the mainland.
As a result, cross-strait relations became an overriding issue in the electoral debate, allowing DPP politicians and the media to divert discussions away from the
domestic issues (such as pension reform and labour law amendments) that put Tsai at a disadvantage.
In comparison, Hong Kong’s protests have spelt disaster for the KMT opposition and Han – dubbed the “Communist Party representative” for his
meetings with the head of the mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Liu Jieyi, and Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor earlier this year.
KMT supporters have also become frustrated with
Beijing’s redefining of the 1992 consensus, its unpopular “one country, two systems” proposal, and its attempts to engineer Taiwan’s demise by
diplomatic coercion. Xi’s reunification proposal leaves the KMT with no cross-strait agenda to campaign against Tsai’s
clearly elaborated “four musts”, “three shields” plan.
Meanwhile, Hongkongers’ increasing concern over the erosion of the “high degree of autonomy” has left the KMT’s cross-strait peace treaty proposal as an unviable campaign plank, with many voters seeing no credibility in arrangements with the mainland.
Although Han said in late June that “one country, two systems” would only happen “
over my dead body”, his delayed reaction to the Hong Kong protests, coupled with KMT’s history of advocating cross-strait cooperation, has failed to shift public opinion in their favour.
In contrast, Tsai’s consistency in defying Beijing’s pressing demands means she is seen as the farsighted and credible guardian of Taiwan’s autonomy and democracy. The KMT can no longer frame Taiwan’s constricted international presence and tourism decline as Tsai’s policy failures, as more voters see these the result of Beijing’s domineering coercion. Many even favour impaired cross-strait relations. As Hong Kong’s crisis pushed the narrative of “safeguarding democracy” to new heights, Taiwanese voters across party affiliations and ages have become markedly supportive of Tsai’s tough policies against the mainland, boosting her ratings.
Polls were still showing a marked tendency towards unification at the beginning of Tsai’s term, but since mid-2018, opinion has turned sharply in favour of independence. This is due to the removal of Xi’s presidential
term limits, Beijing’s eagerness to delegitimise Taiwan on the world stage, the
intensification of China’s military drills and patrols, and the decline in mainland Chinese tourist arrivals.
Such instances of coercion are expected to continue, given that the Central Committee’s 4th plenary session in Beijing pledged to establish “
national security measures” in Hong Kong, and that Xi’s strong hold on power is likely to propel China along the path of enforcing a modern party state with the
dream of unification in mind.
Taiwan is likely to continue to defend its identity and enforce its independence as its distrust for “one country, two systems” deepens in response to Beijing’s efforts to stabilise Hong Kong, and as Taiwanese observe the increasing institutional divide between democratic Taiwan and China’s powerful, authoritarian, surveillance state. Tsai and her ruling DPP are likely to continue to enjoy popular support.
Last year, Tsai’s DPP suffered a
big defeat in the local elections. Tsai has reversed the situation, although polls still reflect less-than-mediocre support for her domestic policies. Still, until the presidential election is concluded, the crisis in Hong Kong and the cross-strait issue will probably continue to outweigh the negative repercussions of Tsai’s domestic policies.
As the political turmoil in Hong Kong goes on, and the slogan “
Hong Kong today, Taiwan tomorrow” continues to be heard on the streets, Tsai may already have prepared her victory address.
The KMT can do little to improve its chances: it cannot compete against the DPP’s staunch defence of Taiwan’s identity and independence, and promoting closer cross-strait ties only draws accusations that it is trading Taiwan’s autonomy away.
The very moment that Hong Kong’s protests descended into chaos was the last nail in the coffin of the Kuomintang’s presidential election hopes.
Jo Kim, a Taiwanese-Canadian, holds an M.L. in international politics from Fudan University and resides in Shanghai
