When the controversial new national security law for Hong Kong was announced during China’s National People’s Congress in May, the usual chorus of China hawks in the United States responded in turn with outrage. The US Congress was no different. Notorious China hawks such as Florida Senator Marco Rubio sharply criticised the proposed bill and vowed to take action. Last week, the US Senate unanimously passed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act , which would place mandatory sanctions on individuals and entities deemed responsible for the degradation of Hong Kong’s autonomy. And Rubio and New Jersey Senator Bob Menendez introduced a bill to allow asylum for Hong Kong residents deemed at risk under the new security law, including protesters and prominent dissidents. Over the last year, as Hong Kong has been embroiled in protests, I have watched US Congress members, administration personnel and the media consistently demonstrate their failure to understand Hong Kong. Their rhetoric surrounding the extradition bill, protests and now the national security law suggests that Beijing is attempting a hostile takeover of the island. A New York Post piece began with “Hong Kong can kiss its independence goodbye”, a rumination that fundamentally fails to recognise that Hong Kong was not independent, and that only the most fringe elements of the protests last year were even calling for independence. In unanimously passing the new sanctions bill, senators may believe they are standing up to Beijing, but they fail to understand that Hong Kong is part of China, and that no amount of sanctions, threats or editorials will stand in the way of Beijing protecting its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Legislation such as the Hong Kong Autonomy Act may seem well intended, but a deeper look shows just how empty a gesture it is. If the individuals and entities sanctioned do not own property or invest in the US stock exchange, the sanctions will have virtually no impact . Further, the actual text of the sanctions bill shows that it is not nearly as decisive as it has been portrayed. The bill requires the State Department to report annually on foreign individuals, entities and financial institutions that “materially contribute” to China’s noncompliance with the Basic Law. The president can sanction any individual named in a report, and must sanction anyone named in two reports. But even these mandates are watered down. Individuals can be kept out of reports for “various reasons”, including for intelligence purposes. Also, the president can waive or terminate sanctions for no reason whatsoever. Most sanctions bills passed by Congress include such a provision, which enables the president to disregard the requirements if they impede his foreign policy objectives or, in his view, run contrary to the national interest. This is because Congress’s foreign policy powers are constitutionally minimal, while the president’s are much broader. Congress can only override such a termination with a joint declaration of disapproval. While there is strong bipartisan support for taking stronger action against Hong Kong, it remains to be seen whether the president’s Republican allies in Congress would be willing to directly override his wishes. China responded last weekend by announcing retaliatory visa sanctions on American individuals responsible for “egregious conduct relating to Hong Kong”. China lashes out at Five Eyes as Britain, Australia offer to help Hongkongers While not specifying which American officials would be subject to sanctions, China’s actions are likely to have just as little impact on Congress’ behaviour as the US sanctions are apt to have on Beijing’s. If anything, it will only inspire another cycle of escalation and retaliation. So why impose these sanctions in the first place? Imposing sanctions is a means for Congress to demonstrate that it cares about the national security law and is concerned about Hong Kong. In the last few years, there has been a growing bipartisan consensus that US policy towards China has grown too accommodating and that a more robust approach is warranted. With 35 senators and all 435 members of the House of Representatives up for election in November, both parties are seeking to demonstrate to voters that they are taking the China issue seriously – especially amid the coronavirus pandemic, which has driven public perception of China to historic lows. Voting to sanction China over Hong Kong is a simple way for Congress members to show their constituents they are “tough” on China . Whether the sanctions have any impact is irrelevant. The only real goal is to pass a piece of anti-China legislation, consequences be damned. Even if these sanctions were imposed, do any of the senators who voted for them actually think President Xi Jinping will change his mind about national security? Xi could never renege on a commitment like this and risk damaging his legitimacy among the Chinese people, which is rooted in nationalism and protecting China’s territorial integrity – especially against the Western powers and their attempts to export liberal principles. I worked for the Library of Congress for 47 years, including as head of the Chinese and Korean section. I prepared briefing papers and gave in-person briefings on China to prominent members of Congress and their staff. I am intimately familiar with the process by which Congress has traditionally been informed about China and how legislation has been influenced. Given this background, I question what sort of briefing came before this new Senate bill on Hong Kong. Perhaps the initial co-sponsors of the bill – Pennsylvania Senator Pat Toomey and Maryland Senator Chris Van Hollen – disregarded whatever briefing on China they received, or perhaps they fundamentally believe – naively – that this legislation will make a difference. Why Beijing sees US election as battle of ‘anti-China hawks’ Regardless of effectiveness, the Hong Kong Autonomy Act is likely to become law in a matter of days. The House version of the bill was passed by unanimous consent on Wednesday, and a day later, the Senate unanimously passed the House version. The bill now awaits President Donald Trump’s signature. But other than contributing to the animosity between the US and China, and the disdain for Congress’ perceived interference in China’s internal affairs, I fail to see what this bill is really going to accomplish in terms of US-China relations. Perhaps US voters angry at China over the coronavirus will feel vindicated, but that is far from the intended purpose of Congressional sanctions. Chi Wang, a former head of the Chinese section of the US Library of Congress, is president of the US-China Policy Foundation