Opinion | Hong Kong national security law: New institutions show China’s true intent
- New law devotes a great deal of attention to setting up special institutions and procedures for handling cases deemed to involve national security
- Assurances over constraints on these institutions are weakened by central government’s treatment of Gui Minhai, Pu Zhiqiang and other political enemies
“I don't care who does the electing, so long as I get to do the nominating.” So said Boss Tweed, head of 19th century New York’s infamous Tammany Hall political machine. By the same token, it matters less who does the legislating or what they legislate than who does the prosecuting and judging.
The relevant part of the quote in full, with the omitted material italicised, is: “It’s the institutions and the processes that count. Language matters only if there are institutions that will make it matter. This whole law is about avoiding the involvement of such institutions.”
Thus, Mr Tong’s question – “So what institutions are the professor saying had been ‘avoided’ by the law?” – is easily answered: institutions that will make language matter. Here is what I mean.
02:45
Hong Kong hotel becomes home to Beijing’s new national security office in the city
In effect, the security law sets up two separate tracks for handling such cases, either of which can be used. The first track consists of Hong Kong institutions staffed largely by Hong Kong people. However, at each stage of the case – investigation, prosecution and adjudication – the law deems the ordinary process of law in Hong Kong to be inadequate and sets up special bodies whose staffing is heavily influenced by mainland authorities.