China-India relations: Ladakh stand-off need not be a prelude to war
- If these nuclear states and rivals want to manage, stabilise and eventually transcend the security dilemma, they must incrementally build trust
- Greater appreciation of the fears of one’s adversary paves the way for deeper dialogue and a trusting relationship, though this needs a delicate balancing act
In light of Sino-Indian relations reaching a nadir, the common refrain among policy analysts is that India can ill afford to trust China any longer. John Mearsheimer, a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Chicago, restated during a recent interview with India Today his long-standing thesis that world politics is “tragically” bereft of trust and security can only be realised through self-help.
Even as rivals, if India and China are to lead the resurgence of Asia, they must avoid a Pyrrhic war and learn how to trust each other. One can intuitively reasoned that trust is often in short supply among rivals – particularly in times of conflict – but the historical record is surprising.
In 1950, faced with a refugee crisis on the Bengal border and the immediate prospect of state failure, India’s then-prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his Pakistani counterpart Liaquat Ali Khan avoided war and established a trusting relationship on the subject of religious minorities. In this instance, trust was possible despite an ongoing struggle over Kashmir, the trauma of Partition and active warmongering by prominent sections of the domestic population and media on both sides.
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First, states must be open to the possibility their adversaries may be fearful rather than revisionist. In other words, before deliberating on whether China should trust India or vice versa, we must ask why one actor may be mistrustful of the other.
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Second, once an actor accepts the other may be acting because of mistrust, it should seek pathways to reassure its adversary of its defensive intent. In essence, both India and China should signal to each other the mutual necessity of road and infrastructure development in border areas.
So far, diplomatic engagement has followed every inflection point, with the de-escalation plan of June 22 and subsequent disengagement in the Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso and Gogra-Hot Springs being the latest iteration.
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Third, to develop a relationship of reciprocity, previous agreements and confidence-building measures must be revised and updated. Clearly, the challenges of “maintaining peace and tranquillity”, to quote the border agreement of 1993, between India and China are different now. While no shots were fired during the skirmishes on June 15, the fact that the deadliest clashes on the border in the last 50 years occurred is a watershed and demands a reconsideration of existing frameworks.
In essence, a greater appreciation of the fears of one’s adversary paves the way for a deeper dialogue and a trusting relationship. This also requires a delicate balancing act, though.
Neither India nor China want the international stigma or material costs of aggressive war, but they also want to avoid the humiliation and domestic costs of territorial expropriation. In this respect, while containment or full-spectrum rivalry may seem instinctive, only incrementally built and contingent trust can meaningfully forge a sustainable relationship between the two nuclear security competitors.
Ameya Pratap Singh is a PhD student in Area Studies (South Asia) at the University of Oxford, researching critical non-Western perspectives on trust-building between adversaries in the Global South