For the longest time, Australia refused to choose between China, its largest trade partner, and the United States, its strongest security ally. But with Sino-Australian diplomatic relations strained, Australia has revealed a change of strategy in choosing to defend its national security by aligning with the US. However, does Australia’s security-centred rhetoric really serve its national interest? Defence hawks see themselves on the moral high ground, protecting Australian values and dignity. Anyone who disagrees and pursues economic engagement with China risks being condemned as disloyal Australians or China apologists. Yet, is economic security not part of national security? Is the creation of jobs not crucial amid an economic downturn? Australia’s policy of trade diversification away from China is a reflection of its focus on the economy and employment, and of its worries about becoming too dependent on China. But if this strategy worked, Australia’s worries about China dependence would have disappeared years ago. As Professor James Laurenceson, at the University of Technology Sydney, pointed out last year, economic ties, unlike security or political issues that can be decided upon by officials, mainly depend on “market forces – economic complementarities and purchasing power”, and no other country can match the demand that China offers Australia. Also, as Allan Gyngell, national president of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, wrote last year: “From minerals and natural gas to horticultural products and sophisticated services, Australia is unusually well-placed to meet Chinese demand.” The Economic and Fiscal Update released by the Australian Treasury on July 23 revealed that among Australia’s top 10 trading partners, only China is expected to have GDP growth this year. Must Australia choose between the US and China? As a result, “Australia’s external outlook remains in a better position than many other economies”. Also, with almost all industries shrinking, Treasurer Josh Frydenberg said mining investment was a “bright spot” because of the high demand driven by China. As economist Tim Harcourt wrote last month, there are 7,779 Australian exporters selling to China, compared to 2,550 to Indonesia, 2,512 to the United Arab Emirates and 2,176 to India. Also, there are 3,000 Australian businesses based in China, in contrast to only 100 in Japan, Australia’s second-largest trading partner. Australia’s diversification policy obviously has a long way to go. So, why is this security-focused rhetoric so dominant despite China’s economic importance? Understandably, where some of China’s activities are not in line with Australian values, they attract criticism from defence hawks. But does that mean Australia should throw away its economic security? As Peter Varghese, an Australian former diplomat and public servant, argued recently: “Australia’s interests are best served by engaging [China] bilaterally and multilaterally but also by supporting arrangements to constrain the destabilising aspects of its behaviour.” Australia is not the US. There is no superpow er competition between Beijing and Canberra. The US might fight to retain its top position in the Indo-Pacific by containing China and decoupling but Australia, as a middle power, needs to support a rule-based multilateral system to maintain its national interests, and that necessitates China’s participation. What’s behind Australia’s tougher stance on the South China Sea? There is a difference between an imperfect acquaintance and a rhetorical enemy. The former relationship is manageable through diplomacy, without the need for too much concern about domestic audiences. In comparison, the latter is full of heat and messy squabbles, and has to take into consideration public opinion. And unfortunately, when you treat someone as an enemy, you become enemies. With the involvement of Australian domestic politics, Sino-Australian relations now belong to the second scenario. The vocabulary in the security-centred rhetoric does not help relations. “Standing up against China” may sound heroic and sensational but Beijing finds it laughable that any state needs to stand up against a country that was bloodily bullied for more than a century . “Public interventions and rhetorical grenades designed to gain attention or tactical advantage serve little purpose, and distract from the far more challenging task at hand,” wrote the opposition Labor Party’s foreign affairs spokeswoman, Penny Wong. Ultimately, Canberra needs to figure out how to lead a balanced and moderate discourse, beyond the three-year election cycle, and which differs from the petulant security-centred rhetoric, to best serve Australia’s national interests. This does not mean limiting its freedom of speech, or biting the hand that feeds it. Canberra can criticise China but this should at least be done diplomatically with the long-term view in mind. Yuan Jiang is a Chinese PhD student in the Digital Media Research Centre at the Queensland University of Technology