With less than three months to go until the US presidential election, the anti-China train in Washington is roaring full steam ahead. From bans on Huawei, TikTok and WeChat to recommendations to delist US-listed Chinese companies and cancellation of trade talks – not to mention military drills in the South China Sea and sanctions on Hong Kong officials over the national security law – US President Donald Trump has well and truly gone out of his way to make China-bashing his top policy priority for a second term. Yet, for all these efforts, it must be disheartening to find that about 60 per cent of respondents in the latest Gallup poll disapproved of Trump’s handling of US-China relations. Not only was this figure higher than the 48 per cent last year, the public also thought he was doing a worse job on China than on crime, foreign affairs and the economy. It is no surprise that the American public has taken issue with Trump’s (mis)handling of China. This is not because Americans hold China in high regard. Quite the opposite : US public opinion has decidedly soured on China, driven by political vitriol and constant fearmongering in the media. Yet, Americans are also increasingly questioning whether the US has benefited from making China a cold war enemy, and wondering if their government is spending too much time and effort to force change in China , while leaving plenty of urgent matters at home unattended. Take the centrepiece of Trump’s economic policy – the US-China trade war – as an example. Two years of tit-for-tat tariff exchanges have led to a dramatic decline in trade flows between the two countries. But did Americans at least get a bigger slice of the shrinking pie? Not according to research from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which showed that nearly all the costs of higher import duties were borne by US firms and consumers . One thing that the tariffs did achieve was forcing China out of the US market. Our research shows that China has lost almost 2 percentage points of its share of imports to the US between 2017 and 2019. Hence, if the trade war was intended to reduce the US’ dependency on “Made in China” goods, it would have succeeded somewhat. China is wise to ease tensions as Trump seeks an election boost Except that wasn’t the aim, at least not the main one. As reiterated by Trump, the trade war was aimed at reducing the US-China trade imbalance , as well as bringing jobs and supply chains back home. Sadly, the tariffs have failed on both these counts. According to official data, China’s monthly trade surplus with the US has averaged about US$27 billion since July 2018, up from an average of US$21 billion in the prior five years. In fact, the US’ overall trade deficit has risen from US$41 billion a month to US$48.4 billion over the same period. Furthermore, China has lost market share in the US not to American producers, but to Mexican and Vietnamese firms, whose gains are roughly matching China’s loss. In other words, Trump’s trade war with China has cost American consumers plenty, widened the US’ trade imbalances, and benefited other emerging exporters at the expense of American firms. On the other side of the trade war, while Chinese producers were squeezed out of the US, many were able to redirect their exports elsewhere. Calculations based on World Trade Organisation data show that China’s global export market share increased by almost half a percentage point despite its market share loss in the US, putting it ahead of the likes of Mexico and Vietnam. Part of this gain was due to export diversion. By selling inputs to third countries for assembly before the final products are shipped to the US, China was able to circumvent some import duties imposed by Washington. Indeed, our research has revealed a marked increase in China’s contribution to the export value-added of many of its trading partners since the trade war started. I surmised previously that while deglobalisation would inevitably force some production out of China, the country has the means to retain an influence over lost supply chains. Its experience over the past two years shows that with an open and cooperative mindset, China can pull many of its trading partners into its supply chain orbit by making them dependent on its provision of inputs. With many firms now adopting a “China-plus-one” model for supply chains, the manufacturing network currently centred on China could be strengthened and broadened within the region. If done right, a transition from “Made in China” to “Made around China” could accelerate Asia’s regional economic integration, leading to stronger regionalisation at a time when globalisation is in retreat. Aidan Yao is senior emerging Asia economist at AXA Investment Managers