Hong Kong’s national security law represents different things to different people and, nearly two months after it came into effect, the law remains highly controversial. Much of the controversy is over the purpose of the law, with some saying it was needed to end the street violence that characterised the second half of 2019 and early 2020 before the arrival of the coronavirus while others deplore the increase in mainland control and the loss of autonomy. While Western critics – including officials, legislators and non-governmental organisations – stressed that Beijing should not legislate for Hong Kong and feared the impact on human rights, China responded that this was an internal affair and, besides, it had the support of the Hong Kong people. In the weeks before the law was unveiled, the Hong Kong government mounted a widespread campaign to promote it through messages on radio and television as well as ads in MTR stations and on the sides of buses, minibuses and trams. High pressure tactics were applied to members of the business elite. An example of this was a Facebook post by former Hong Kong chief executive Leung Chun-ying. Leung complained that HSBC had not made its position clear on the proposed law, even though it derived most of its profits from China. The message was received loud and clear. Days later, HSBC Asia-Pacific chief executive Peter Wong Tung-shun voiced his support for the law in an interview with Xinhua, China’s state news agency. He said that he hoped the security law, whose contents were still unknown, would “bring long-term stability and prosperity” to Hong Kong. The international community’s focus was on the need to protect human rights. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet stressed that any legislation for Hong Kong must meet China’s human rights obligations. After it was promulgated , the law only became public an hour before midnight on June 30. Perhaps as a result of the numerous calls for human rights protection, Article 4 of the law says, comfortingly, “Human rights shall be respected and protected in safeguarding national security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.” But, of course, saying – even in a law – and doing are two separate things. China sometimes seems to confuse the two. For example, in 2004, there was an amendment to the Chinese constitution by which seven words were added: “The state respects and protects human rights.” No other legislative changes accompanied those words. China’s attitude seemed to be that simply adding that sentence to the constitution made it true. Subsequently, Chinese officials, pressed on the country’s human rights performance, would point to that article as though the words alone were sufficient proof that China’s behaviour had changed. The United States took the position that the passage of the national security legislation proved that “one country, two systems” was over and thus Washington would cease treating Hong Kong as different from the rest of China, including not treating the city as a separate customs territory. Zhang Xiaoming, deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the State Council, defended and explained the legislation at a press conference on July 1, hours after the new law had come into effect. He asserted that it “perfectly combines adherence to the ‘one country’ principle and respect for the differences between ‘two systems’.” First defendant charged under Hong Kong security law denied bail again Zhang said one purpose of the law was “correcting deviations” or, to put it more vividly, “to draw closer to ‘one country’.” That is to say, too much emphasis had been put on Hong Kong’s separate system. Interestingly, Article 4 of the national security law cites “the freedoms of speech, of the press, of publication, of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration” as rights to be protected. They correspond to Article 27 of the Basic Law but leave out two: “The right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and the right to strike.” The omission is not accidental. Those rights are not recognised in mainland China, where trade unions are banned and strikes are outlawed. The rights listed in the security law correspond exactly to those listed in Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution. So that, evidently, is what the security legislation does: it not only leaves Hong Kong with less autonomy, it makes Hong Kong more like the mainland. We may not be there yet, but the journey has begun. Frank Ching is a Hong Kong-based writer and commentator. frank.ching@gmail.com . Follow him on Twitter: @FrankChing1