Why China lacks ‘discourse power’
- Beijing is right to fret about its lack of ‘huayuquan’, but unless it masters the art of public relations and shaping public opinion, the essential skill set of successful Western politicians, they will always find it hard to compete in the international arena
China’s intellectuals and policymakers fret a lot about what they call huayuquan. It’s often translated as discourse power, though literally, it means the right to speak or the power/authority to speak.
Their frustration and anxiety is understandable. China has become a global power and the second-largest economy in the world, yet its discourse power, part of its soft power, is not commensurate with its hard power. The West, especially the United States, may be in decline – that is, at least by some socio-economic matrices – but its discourse power still predominates.
Is the West in decline?
Xi Jinping took power in late 2012. By the following year, huayuquan became a matter of national policy and part of a comprehensive foreign policy. Key party conferences were held to emphasise its importance. At the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference in August 2013, Xi told officials the “propaganda, ideological and cultural front” should grasp huayuquan to tell China’s stories and spread her voice.
In September, at the third plenary session of the 18th party congress, the deepening of reform was adopted, which included strengthening its international communication capacity “to promote its culture throughout the world, and to build a system of discourse for the outside world”. Then in December, the 12th Politburo collective study focused on “improving the nation’s culture and soft power” by enhancing China’s huayuquan.
Today, China has no difficulty speaking out and making itself heard. However, the real issue is whether it is listened to and whether it is getting its messages across. By virtue of its state authoritarianism, the central government in Beijing has one great advantage that Western public relations companies try to make sure their corporate clients adhere to: speak through a single official channel, with a single, uniform message.
Western governments, on the other hand, have much greater problems preventing what may be called “message or information leakage”, requiring, for example, the late US president Richard Nixon to call in “the plumbers” that ultimately led to Watergate.
Beijing has no problem defending itself. But when you are overly defensive and jump at every opportunity to denounce your critics, it’s a turn-off, if not counterproductive. Nobody likes angry people, even if you are right. The problem of the so-called wolf warrior diplomats is that they are eager to speak out, but not mindful enough to consider how they are perceived and how their messages are received. Their behaviour may be good for their careers, but not necessarily their country in the long run.
China’s messaging problem is that while the ruling party’s slogans and jargon are highly effective in exerting control domestically, they are often counterproductive when used overseas. Here, a bit of creativity, or at least greater latitude, is needed to manage the message aimed at an international audience.
As Nadege Rolland, a former French defence ministry analyst wrote of China’s vision for a new world order, in a report for the US-based National Bureau of Asian Research: “The CCP’s jargon, what Perry Link describes as a ‘ritualised language’, has long been deliberately developed as a means to control discourse within China itself.
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“It is a tool used by the party, its propaganda organs, the media and educators to shape (and circumscribe) the way people express themselves in the public (and eventually private) sphere.
“By proscribing some formulations and prescribing others, [Chinese officials] set out to regulate what is being said and what is being written – and by extension what is being done. The lexicon of catchphrases used by the party-state may sometimes sound ungainly to the foreign ear.”
What works domestically does not work internationally. The problem with communist officials is that they think the message is the most important when in fact, it is often secondary. Competent PR professionals and “spin doctors” know that the medium, the manner and channel you use to deliver your message are just as important, if not more so.
To give a trivial example, in 2016, during an official visit, angry Foreign Minister Wang Yi berated a Canadian journalist at a press conference in Ottawa for asking an “irresponsible” question about China’s human rights record.
Many Canadians still remember that incident, though few could recall what Wang actually said or what exactly the reporter asked about. In other words, they didn’t take the message that Wang hoped to convey, but had the lasting impression that Chinese officials were aggressive, rude and had no respect for the press.
That may well be true, though I suspect many big-time Western politicians share the same attitude; they just don’t show it. Cue: smile at the camera and hug babies.
By virtue of the democratic nature of Western governments, politicians have long understood the need for public relations to shape and manipulate public opinion and to manufacture consent. It is, after all, their bread and butter, an essential skill set that they must master. Chinese officials don’t operate in the same political environment domestically, and that puts them at a disadvantage when they go aboard. Interestingly, though, private sector executives in China, especially those in the tech field, have learned to dress and act like the late Steve Jobs.
It doesn’t hurt to act like your enemies, if it means defeating them at their own game.
