Joe Biden cannot afford to repeat Donald Trump’s mistake of leaving Southeast Asia to China
- For all their cautious public remarks, Southeast Asian governments still fret over China’s influence and would welcome a return to US engagement in the region
- A foreign policy better geared to Southeast Asia’s needs is not incompatible with promoting US economic and security national interests or competing with China
As US President-elect Joe Biden maps out his transition plan, Southeast Asia probably will not be high on an agenda littered with urgent challenges. The Biden team should not let other matters crowd out Southeast Asia for too long, though.
Still, however careful their public remarks, Southeast Asian governments do not want to be left on their own with China. A reinvigorated US diplomatic strategy, one that encompasses competition with China while valuing Southeast Asian partnerships in their own right, would be welcomed across the region.
To rebuild influence, the incoming Biden administration will have to work better with the grain of the region. This undoubtedly will produce its share of frustrations given the caution of most Southeast Asian countries, the region’s anxiety about “Asean centrality” and the patchy performance of regional institutions.
06:04
US-China relations: Joe Biden would approach China with more ‘regularity and normality’
Equally, US foreign policy in Southeast Asia must encompass the reality of China’s economic pull. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong speaks for the region when he says it “cannot afford to alienate China” and that “other Asian countries will try their best not to let any single dispute dominate their overall relationships with Beijing”.
Faced with these enduring realities, the United States should not waste diplomatic capital trying to win Southeast Asia to its side. Rather, the objective should be to keep Asean safely in the middle.
The US needs a more consistent and intensive commitment to the region, one that values Southeast Asian nations for their own sake, not simply as chess pieces in the new great game.
Southeast Asia will understand an incoming Biden administration will have many pressing priorities, domestic and international, but it will nonetheless be looking for signs of intent and commitment.
02:14
Japan-US hold joint military drills including cyberwarfare training as concerns about China grow
A new Biden administration could respond to the needs of a region economically smashed by Covid-19. The US could start by further ramping up aid for recovery. This is what Southeast Asia really wants and needs.
Southeast Asian nations face long, hard road to recovery
Over the medium term, a Biden administration could work to fill the hole in the US regional trade agenda caused by Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
To quote Singapore’s prime minister again, the region sees them as “platforms that enable Asia-Pacific countries to cooperate with one another, develop stakes in one another’s success, and together mould the regional architecture and the rules that govern it”.
Biden has been clear that if the US ever joins the CPTPP, it will not be in a hurry. There are alternatives that could be more politically palatable stepping stones, though, as the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Wendy Cutler recently explored. An interim sectoral agreement, for example, on digital trade or trade in medical products are options.
China looks to outflank US with bid to join CPTPP
The Biden team needs to get the balance right in its democracy and human rights advocacy. There is more the region’s democratic partners can and should do to fight corruption and support human rights and the rule of law, but the United States cannot afford to make values the primary driver of its engagement in Southeast Asia.
A revamped US diplomatic strategy for Southeast Asia will better support the region’s long-term resilience and sovereignty in an era of rising Chinese influence.
Richard Maude is executive director (policy) of Asia Society Australia and senior fellow of Asia Society Policy Institute. This article is published in a content partnership with the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Covid New (Ab)Normal initiative.